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Render Unto Uncle Sam That
Which is Uncle Sam's: The IRS
and Tax Protest Evangelism
I. INTRODUCTION
April 15 is a day of triumph for the American system. It is the
day each year by which the vast majority of United States taxpay-
ers will have discharged their common duty to finance their gov-
ernment,1 reaffirming Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that
every American feels a personal interest in obeying the law.2 April
15 is the day the system works; it is the day when Americans vol-
untarily assess their own income, calculate their tax liability, and
send in what they owe.
Such a Pollyannish view is supported by much evidence. For
example, in 1979 Americans reported about 93 per cent of their re-
portable legal income,3 and paid some $251.5 billion in individual
income taxes.4 This was despite the fact that the Internal Revenue
1. See IRS Response to the Illegal Tax Protester Movement: Hearing Before the
Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1981) (statement of Ros-
coe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as
IRS Response ] (" [T] he vast majority of taxpayers are honest, and do not at-
tempt to thwart the tax administration system.").
2. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVHLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 247-48 (F. Bowen trans. 2d ed.
1946).
[I]n the United States everyone is personally interested in enforcing
the obedience of the whole community to the law; for as the minority
may shortly rally the majority to its principles, it is interested in pro-
fessing that respect for the decrees of the legislator which it may
soon have occasion to claim for its own. However irksome an enact-
ment may be, the citizen of the United States complies with it, not
only because it is the work of the majority, but because it is his own,
and he regards it as a contract to which he himself is a party.
3. The Underground Economy: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13, table 2 (1979) (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as The Underground Economy].
4. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNTrED STATES 268, table 446 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRAcr].
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Service (IRS)5 was able to audit only about two per cent6 of the
92,630,0007 individual and fiduciary income tax returns filed that
year.
However, the evidence also supports a darker view of taxpayer
behavior and motivation. Of the more than a quarter-trillion tax
dollars paid in 1979, $195.3 billion had been withheld at the source
before ever reaching the hands of the taxpayers.8 Wage and salary
earners, who are subject to such withholding, reported about 98
per cent of their income,9 but only about 62 per cent of self-employ-
ment income, which is exempt from tax withholding, was re-
ported.'0 The unreported income is part of a growing"
underground economy12 which amounts to more than 10 per cent
of the United States' legal gross national product,'3 and which
5. Citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless indicated
otherwise.
6. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
This audit percentage has dropped steadily. The IRS audited 5 percent of the
returns filed in 1964. In 1981 the figure dropped to 1.8 percent, and in 1982 the
Service expects to audit only 1.6 percent of returns. TIME, Apr. 12, 1982, at 56.
7. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 268, table 446.
8. Id.
9. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 13, table 2 (statement of Jerome
Kurtz).
10. Id.; Federal Noncompliance with Tax Law Reporting Requirements: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980) (statement of Philip Coates, Assistant Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as Federal Noncompliance].
11. See TiME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 57; see also infra note 13.
12. See infra notes 21-24 & accompanying text. Other terms for the same idea
include "subterranean economy" and "irregular economy."
13. An IRS study of the underground economy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ESTIMATES OF INCOME UNREPORTED ON INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAx RETURNs, PUBLICATION No. 1104 (1979), yielded an estimate that
individuals did not report $75-100 billion of income from legal activities for the
tax year of 1976, and that another $25-35 billion of earnings from drug sales,
illegal gambling, and prostitution was not reported. Also for 1976, individuals
did not report income taxes of $142 billion on $1,073 billion of income. See The
Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
The IRS estimates have been criticized as being too low because they did
not include many substantial types of illegal income. See id. at 35 (statement
of Richard L Fogel, Associate Director, General Government Division, Gen-
eral Accounting Office). Economist Peter Gutmann, using a different
method, measured the underground economy to be $176 billion (in gross na-
tional product terms) for 1976, making the underground economy a little
larger than 10 percent of the gross national product. However, Gutmann saw
this estimate as too low, and said that the actual figure should be 13-14 per-
cent of GNP. Id. at 29-30 (statement of Peter Gutmann). Gutmann estimated
that the underground economy for 1981 would prove to be about $420 billion,
or 14 percent of the official expected GNP. Francis, Light on the 'subterranean
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robbed the national treasury of up to $26 billion in 1976.14
Government concern about the effects of the underground
economy on national revenues15 and other areas 16 has surfaced in
economy' exposes U.S. policy problems, Christian Science Monitor, July 22,
1981, at 11, coL 1.
For an analysis of the IRS study of unreported income and estimates of
the amounts of illegal income from categories not included in the IRS report,
see Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Analysis of IRS
Study of Unreported Illegal-Source Income (Oct. 5,1979) (memorandum), re-
printed in Underground Economy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Underground Economy].
14. Subterranean or Underground Economy: Hearings Before the Commerce, Con-
sumer and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, tables 3, 4 (1979) (statement of Jerome
Kurtz) [hereinafter cited as Subterranean or Underground Economy]. This
figure is also likely too low. Peter Gutmann, see supra note 13, put the tax
loss for 1976 at $35 billion. For 1979, Gutmann estimated the tax loss to be
over $50 billion. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 31 (statement of
Peter Gutmann).
15. This Comment focuses solely on the United States. However, the under-
ground economy and tax evasion are worldwide phenomena. See Ellis, Italy's
Prosperous Anarchy, FoRBEs, Apr. 2, 1979, at 36; Willis, Britain's black market
puts cash in pockets, Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 9, 1981, at 6, coL 1; U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 22, 1979, at 53; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr.
9, 1979, at 39.
Italy in particular is an extreme example of the extent to which "black
labor" can permeate a country's economy and culture. Although official sta-
tistics for per capita Gross Domestic Production put Italy far down the list of
European countries for standard of living, the actual condition of the Italian
economy is much better. Off-the-books productivity may increase the official
GDP by 13 to 14 percent, and official unemployment figures are off by 45 per-
cent in some areas. Three quarters of the public sector employees moonlight;
they are lowly paid and work on the average a six hour day. Badly equipped
and underpaid tax collectors, who enjoy scant popular support, are able to
nab only a small percentage of tax evaders, and the hopelessly dilatory court
system takes years to convict even obvious offenders-reform legislation reg-
ularly is killed under lobbying by businesses and professionals. Ellis, supra,
at 36.
16. For a summary of Prof. Peter Gutmann's conclusions about the underground
economy's effects on official statistics and on economic and social policy, see
Francis, supra note 13. Off-the-books transactions skew official statistics,
causing policymakers to take "inappropriate actions which are injurious to
the nation's economy." Id. For example, the labor force actually is about 5 to
6 percent higher than the Department of Labor believes, the unemployment
rate is nearly two points lower, inflation is slightly greater, productivity per
worker and per man-hour is greater, economic growth is faster, savings and
investments are larger, the actual gross national product is higher, living
standards are higher, and poverty is less. In reliance on errant data, the gov-
ernment may overestimate the economy, causing more inflation. Also, be-
cause tax evasion is relatively easy in such areas as retailing, services, and
construction, too much is invested in those areas, although they normally dis-
play low productivity gains relative to areas in which tax evasion is more diffi-
cult. Id. See also The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 36 (statement
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
recent years,17 and has generated a number of proposals for deal-
ing with the problem.18 In some areas actions taken to cope with
of Richard L Fogel). But see id. at 38-47 (statement of James S. Henry).
Henry, a lawyer and economist, in explaining the underground economy,
puts more emphasis on tax evasion by the self-employed in higher income
brackets (rather than the poor working off-the-books in order to cheat on un-
employment compensation and welfare), and on such profit motivated crime
as gambling and drug traffic.
17. See, e.g., IRS Response, supra note 1; Federal Noncompliance, supra note 10;
The Underground Economy, supra note 3; Underground Economy, supra
note 13; Subterranean or Underground Economy, supra note 14; Multiple
False Filings of Tax Returns for Refunds: Hearings Before the Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommr of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Multiple
False Filings].
18. Proposals for countering the underground economy are of three types. One
group of suggestions would attack the causes of tax evasion by reducing mar-
ginal tax rates, widening tax brackets to give a break to middle income tax-
payers, rewriting Social Security rules to allow elderly recipients to earn
more without suffering a corresponding reduction in benefits, reducing infla-
tion, or reforming tax laws in general to make them more fair to all (such as
eliminating tax loopholes which make the tax system seem unfair to those
who cannot use them). Another set of ideas emphasizes enforcement of tax
laws and would, for example, require welfare and unemployment compensa-
tion recipients to do public service work as a way to deter them from working
off-the-books, or strengthen the IRS's enforcement powers to scare people
into reporting. The third type of proposals accepts the underground economy
as given, and attempts to even out the resulting inequities by rewarding cor-
porations whose internal control systems preclude tax evasion with tax cred-
its proportionate to the cost of maintaining the internal controls, or with a
lower tax base or schedule-this to offset somewhat the phantom off-the-book
expenses and deflated sales figures claimed by tax evading competitors. See
Francis, supra note 13; Nigro, Proposition 13 and Subterreanean Income, USA
TODAY, Jan. 1980, at 20.
IRS proposals, of course, fit the second category. Service measures for
dealing with the underground economy include: (1) allocate more examina-
tion resources to specific areas of noncompliance; (2) match income tax re-
turns with information documents reporting wages, interest, dividends, and
other types of income in order to select returns for examination and to give
auditors leads to unreported income in audits under the regular process;
(3) design a more objective scoring system for identifying the most signifi-
cant nonfiler leads for investigation; (4) make better use of reports by
financial institutions of large currency traffic; (5) cooperate with employers in
identifying questionable W-4 forms; (6) pay more attention to bartering as
income and audit organizers of bartering exchanges; (7) step up research into
causes of noncompliance. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 5-6
(statement of Jerome Kurtz).
Congress recently gave the IRS much of what it wanted to strike back
against the underground economy and tax protesters by passing the Tax Eq-
uity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-494, 96 Stat. 324
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Tax Act]. The compliance aspects of the tax
increase bill emphasize expanded withholding, see infra notes 260, 261 & ac-
companying text, expanded information reporting, see infra notes 174, 260,
261, 273, 275 & accompanying text, and stiffened civil and criminal penalties,
[Vol. 61:681
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the underground economy have met some success;19 however,
there is little likelihood of a quick solution.20
The subject of this Comment, the illegal tax protest movement,
see infra notes 190, 202, 208, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 223, 227, 234, 239, 240, 243, 260,
261, 275 & accompanying text.
Still, the Service has a number of other proposals it wants enacted (with
varying degrees of seriousness). The measures were outlined in an option
paper sent by the IRS to the Treasury Secretary. See Robinson & Simon, IRS'
Secret Game Plan, Nat'l IJ., Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The want list, entitled
"Closing the Gap," includes:
-matching commercial real estate sales data with the tax returns of the
parties to the sale in order to detect unreported interest income from "take-
back mortgages," and notifying sellers-mortgagees that they must report
such interest income;
-- requiring states to collect the federal highway user tax;
-reinstituting the pre-refund examination program to target returns
claiming large refunds, large withholding, large contributions, vows of pov-
erty, or some type of protest adjustment,
-further changing interest and civil penalty provisions;
-granting criminal amnesty to taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their
own tax violations before any investigation begins;
-expanding to such businesses as gambling casinos and new car dealers
current reporting requirements involving large currency transactions;
-publicizing and revising the rewards program to encouarge citizens to
report tax violations by other taxpayers;
-recalling all $100 bills in circulation, replacing them with new pink or red
notes, and declaring the old green bills to be worthless.
Prof Gutmann cautions that the IRS's sole criterion for allocating re-
sources should not be maximization of tax collection. This would push eco-
nomic resources toward areas in which tax evasion is the least detectable and
would promote repressive governmental policies which could lead to a back-
lash by the citizenry in the form of constitutional or legislative restrictions on
the tax system. Id. at 31-32 (statement of Peter Gutmann).
19. One program which holds much promise for the IRS is the information re-
turns program, designed to match information documents with tax return
data in order to discover discrepancies in reporting. In 1975, the Service was
able to match only 43 percent of information returns, yielding additional as-
sessments of $275 million and refunds of $94 million, at a cost of $37 million.
By 1977 the matching rate rose to 77 percent. Federal Noncompliance, supra
note 10, at 16. For 1981 the Service matched 100 percent of documents re-
ceived on magnetic media, which accounted for 88 percent of all information
returns, and matched a 25 percent sample of paper information returns. IRS
Response, supra note 1, at 81 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.). The 1982
Tax Act, supra note 18, expanded the information reporting requirements.
See in fra notes 174, 260, 261, 273, 275 & accompanying text.
20. The very existence of the underground economy works against all efforts to
eradicate it. Even assuming that reduced taxes and slower inflation would
draw people back to the legal economy, the mere fact that many people have
learned to operate off-the-books will reduce the speed with which they shift
aboveground. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of
Peter Gutmann). Similarly, if proposals to attack the causes of underground
activity work at all, they will have an effect only on the aspect of the under-
ground economy which is rooted in legal activity. Id. at 69 (letter of Richard
L. Fogel).
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overlaps the underground economy to some extent, but is just as
much a part of the official economy. A simple definition of the un-
derground economy is that portion of economic activity which
should be reported to the Internal Revenue Service but is not.21
This includes income from both legal2 2 and illegal sources,2 3 but
excludes such nonreportable income as church collection plate
receipts. 24
The IRS defines an "illegal tax protester" as "a person who ad-
vocates and/or participates in a scheme with a broad exposure
21. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 22, 1979, at 49.
22. See supra note 13. Typical examples of underground income which would be
legal except for the failure to report it include: weekend flea markets; home
improvement contractors who take only cash in payment and who give no
receipts; cash tips received by waiters (some restaurants discourage custom-
ers from including the tip with their credit card payment); taxi drivers who
shut off the meter for a fare (cheating both the employer, if any, and the IRS);
lawyers who swap legal services for goods or services from the client. Any
economic transaction which can be conducted for cash or barter and without
leaving a paper trail can become part of the underground economy. Because
depositing off-the-books income in bank accounts would leave documentary
evidence of an unreported increase in wealth for IRS auditors to find, much of
the cash income is converted into large bills and stashed away, thus partly
explaining the marked increase in $100 bills in circulation in recent years. See
The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 29 (statement of Peter Gut-
mann); Schultz, The Untaxed Millions, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 16, 1980, at 42;
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 22, 1979, at 49; FORBEs, Aug. 19, 1981, at 102.
The Service's most ambitious proposal for countering the trafficking in
large denomination bills is to recall all $100 bills in circulation and replace
them with new bills of a different color or a different size. Robinson & Simon,
supra note 18, at 10, col. 1. The aim would be to force illegitimate users of
large bills to acknowledge their unreported stashes or find themselves with
worthless paper, to discourage use of big bills, and to fight inflation (assum-
ing criminals with large cash hoards decide to eat the loss rather than reveal
themselves). The spur for the rather extreme plan is a 15% annual increase
in $100 bills in circulation over the last decade; they now comprise about 40%
of the $125 billion in cash in circulation, despite the trend toward credit cards,
electronic funds transfers, and other non-cash methods of monetary transac-
tions. Id.
One related proposal which made it into the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18,
§ 330 (adding I.R.C. § 6867), allows the Service, when it finds someone in
physical possession of more than $10,000 in cash or its equivalent and when
the person denies ownership of it, to levy a jeopardy assessment against it
and collect 50% as tax.
23. Those who receive income from illegal sources have a double incentive to not
report it to the government: to avoid paying taxes, and to elude detection of
the underlying crime. For results of an IRS study of unreported income from
illegal gambling and drug traffic, see The Underground Economy, supra note
3, at 56-60 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
24. This assumes the church has a valid tax exemption. Receipts by a church set
up by a mail order minister in order to evade taxes would be reportable in-
come. See infra § ILC.2.b.
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that results in the illegal underpayment of taxes." 25 Thus, those
tax protesters whose "scheme" includes nonreporting or underre-
porting of income, legal or illegal, are part of the underground
economy.26 However, some tax protesters honestly report all of
their income, but refuse to pay all or part of the tax due on the
income.27 Thus, these individuals fit within the "illegal tax pro-
tester" definition, but are not members of the underground
economy.
This duality on the reporting dimension causes problems for
IRS attempts to deal with, or even detect, illegal tax protesters.28
More problems are caused by the dual nature of another dimen-
sion: motivation of the tax protester.29 While the accountants
overseeing the treasury may care little about why certain citizens
failed to pay taxes, policymakers should be concerned with
whether the "scheme" resulting in underpayment of taxes is
rooted in simple greed or is the product of deeply felt moral princi-
ples.30 Actually, the motivation dimension should be measured on
a sliding scale, with pure principle on one end, amoral greed on the
other, and some mix of the two in the middle.
Tax returns which the Service identifies as coming from "illegal
tax protesters" are subject to special attention from both audi-
tors3 1 and criminal investigators.3 2 In this time of cutbacks in gov-
ernment funding,3 3 the IRS has established an Illegal Tax
Protester Program with a high-priority status.34
This Comment will examine the illegal tax protester phenome-
non and IRS efforts to deal with it in light of current and suggested
tax policy considerations.
25. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, REPORT ON THE STUDY
OF ILLEGAL TAx PROTESTER AcTvrrY (1979) [hereinafter cited as PROTESTER
AcTrVrrY], reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 127, 129.
This definitiori is used by the IRS to select returns for special treatment.
See infra § II. As such, it may be too narrow for our purposes, but it will be
used for guidance.
26. See infra §§ ILC.2.b-d.
27. See infra § ILC.2.a.
28. See infra § ILA.
29. See infra § IIB.
30. See infra § V.
31. See infra §§ IILA-B.
32. See infra § IELC.; see also IRS Response, supra note 1, at 79-80 (statement of
Roscoe L Egger, Jr.).
33. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
34. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 79-80 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.).
1982]
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11. NATURE OF TAX PROTEST MOVEMENT
A. History of Tax Protest
Although some observers of contemporary tax protest see it as
a recent phenomenon,35 tax protesters probably have existed as
long as there have been taxes,36 and refusals to pay taxes have
played an important and colorful role in American history.
In early colonial Massachusetts the Quakers opposed paying
taxes to support Puritan schools and churches, and eventually won
exemptions from such compulsory taxation.37 This was part of a
long tradition of tax resistance among the Quakers and other paci-
fist groups such as the Brethren.38 British taxation of the North
American colonies3 9 caused widespread colonial hostility and pre-
cipitated the American Revolution. 4O Factions of the Church of the
Brethren refused to pay taxes to the new revoluntionary govern-
ment.41 State taxes consuming one-third of the income of Massa-
chusetts farmers led to an epidemic of foreclosures and tax
auctions, which in 1786 touched off Shays' Rebellion, a mobiliza-
tion of desperate farmers who seized courthouses to halt proceed-
ings and forced the Massachusetts Supreme Court to adjourn.42
Although state volunteer militia routed the rebels within a few
months, the incident "fed the growing conviction" that the Articles
of Confederation were inadequate and that only a strong central
35. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 30, 1981, at 80; Omaha World-Herald,
Feb. 14,1982, § B, at 4, col 1; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL AccoUNr-
ING OFFICE, ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTERS THREATEN TAx SYSTEM 13 (1981) (GGD-
81-83) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT ], reprinted in IRS Response, supra
note 1, at 35.
36. An early example was the Zealots, a Jewish faction which revolted against
the Roman occupiers of Israel An opposing sect, the Pharisees, tried to trap
Jesus into aligning himself with the Zealots by asking him if it was lawful to
pay taxes to Caesar. To elude the trap, Jesus pointed to the image of Caesar
superscribed on the Roman coins which the questioners used, and advised,
"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God
the things that are God's." Matthew 22:21; Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25; see also Ro-
mans 13:7.
The early Hutterites refused to pay taxes for the hangman's noose. 98
CHRmSTIAN CENTURY 837, 837 (1981) (letter by Dale Brown) [hereinafter cited
as Brown letter].
37. B. POUISON, EcoNoMc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 133-34 (1981).
38. Brown letter, supra note 36, at 837.
39. American Revenue Act (Sugar Act) of 1764; Stamp Act of 1765 (repealed in
1766 because of colonial hostility); Townshend Acts of 1767; Tea Act of 1773
(sparking the Boston Tea Party).
40. IL BEDFORD & T. COLBOURN, THE AMRicANs: A BRIEF HISTORY TO 1877, at 59-
65 (1972). See generally B.W. LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY (1966).
41. Brown letter, supra note 36, at 837.
42. H. BEDFORD & T. COLBOURN, supra note 40, at 89.
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government could assure law and order.43 Under the new Consti-
tution, drafted in 1787, the strengthened federal government had
the authority to levy an excise tax on whiskey to help pay the na-
tional war debt. It also had the power to use federal troops to
quickly crush the Whiskey Rebellion, an uprising in 1794 by fron-
tier farmers in Pennsylvania in resistance to the new tax.44
On a much smaller scale, but still important, was Henry David
Thoreau's night in a Concord jail in 1847 for refusing for several
years to pay the Massachusetts poll tax as a protest against the
Mexican War.45
Thus, we have examples of four models of tax protest: refusal
for religious reasons to pay taxes to a secular government (or one
controlled by another religious sect), use of tax refusal as a rally-
ing point for toppling the government,46 revolt by taxpayers en
masse against unfair or excessive taxes, and conscientious refusal
to pay a tax which the protester believes will be used for immoral
or objectionable purposes. A fifth model, needing no specific ex-
ample, would be the mine-run tax evader who has better things to
do with his money than give it to the government. Each of these
traditions has counterparts in modern tax protest.47
B. IRS Definition
The first four of the above categories of protesters would easily
43. Id. at 90.
44. Id. at 101. The rebellion evaporated so quickly before the federal onslaught
that the troops had trouble finding rebels to arrest. The few that were ar-
rested received pardons from President George Washington. Massachusetts
Federalist, Fisher Adams, who agreed with the tax program which caused the
rebellion, was troubled by Washington's handling of it: "Elective rulers can
scarcely ever employ the physical force of a democracy without turning the
moral force, or the power of public opinion against the government." Id. See
also B. POULSON, supra note 37, at 144.
45. E.D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 120 (Beacon Series 1942); Tabac, War Tax
RefusaL Some Code Problems, 20 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 215, 215 (1971).
Although Thoreau's protest had no effect whatsoever on the war effort-
friends paid his tax for that year and for subsequent years in order to keep
him out of trouble-it was the "paradigm of civil disobedience." Id.; H.
BEDAU, CrvIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 120-121 (1969).
46. In a nonviolent echo of the American Revolution, Hindu leader Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi worked tax refusal into a revolution which drove the
British from India. Tabac, supra note 45, at 215.
47. Although no American tax protest has replicated the success of Samuel Ad-
ams' Tea Act protesters, a surprisingly similar motivation can be found in the
words of Dean Hazel, an organizer of a Michigan group whose members in
early 1981 filed thousands of false withholding forms: "We want to bring
down the unlawful government of the United States." NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9,
1981, at 33. See infra § ILC.2.d.
19821
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* fit within the IRS definition of illegal tax protesters.48 IRS Com-
missioner Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., explained that the definition is
meant to confine the term, "protester," "to those cases where
somebody is in a sense preaching a gospel; namely, a philosophy
that individuals do not have an obligation to pay taxes, and is at-
tempting to induce others to accept that philosophy."4 9
This definitional net sweeps up both the proselytizer and the
proselytized, and includes both Thoreau and the reader of Civil
Disobedience who refuses to pay the portion of his tax bill which
would go to buy nuclear weapons. It is less clear how the fifth cate-
gory of protester, whose main motive is to hang onto his money,
might fit within the definition.
The IRS is not concerned with the motives of people who fail to
pay taxes except for concern as to how those motives might help
the Service to detect the nonpayment and collect the tax. (At
least, the Service should not be concerned with the moral, reli-
gious, and political5 O beliefs of taxpayers, if it is to maintain its po-
sition as a neutral tax collector.) Among principled tax refusers,
the IRS has properly sensed the danger that tax refusal instigated
by a core group of highly motivated adherents to a particular prin-
ciple might spread to others who share the leaders' beliefs, but
lack their willingness to sacrifice, unless the government can deter
the followers from joining the movement by punishing the leaders.
According to this viewpoint, a policy of making apparent the conse-
quences of tax refusal may not eradicate such behavior altogether,
but it will confine the incidence of illegal tax protest to those who
believe so deeply that they are willing to accept the
48. See supra text accompanying note 25.
49. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 84-85 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.). See
also id. at 18 (statement of William J. Anderson) ("[Plerhaps the definition
of 'tax protester' ought to recognize that we are dealing with schemes where
people are trying to propagate the faith, so to speak, rather than a person
sitting alone and making that decision to cheat.").
50. Legitimate political activities in opposition to taxes are beyond the scope of
this Comment. These include passage of initiatives in California, Massachu-
setts, and Michigan reducing or limiting state and local taxes.
In the United States, illegal tax evasion has never become the impetus for
a significant political movement. By contrast, in Denmark, the Progress
Party, which advocates abolition of taxes, won 28 of 179 seats in Parliament in
1973, just a year after its formation, making it Denmark's second largest polit-
ical party. The Progress Party was founded by Mogens Glistrup, who came to
political prominence in 1971 when he proclaimed that he did not pay taxes
and that "only idiots pay tax." The party's motto: 'Tax evasion is patriot-
ism." One plank in Glistrup's platform was to fire all civil servants. The Pro-
gress Party's share of seats has dropped steadily since its 1973 peak. And in
late 1981, Glistrup received a four year prison sentence and a $1 million fine
for tax evasion. The owner of one of Denmark's largest law firms, he was
barred for life from practicing law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1981, at 5, col 1.
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consequences.51
In some respects deterrence of unprincipled tax evaders should
come more easily. Where the taxpayer has no cause to advance
and is not acting out of a Thoreau-like acceptance of the conse-
quences for his civil disobedience, the taxpayer's decision to pay
or evade his taxes should be based more directly on how strongly
he perceives that he is not going to get away with tax evasion.
However, the unprincipled taxpayer may be swayed from the
straight-and-narrow path of voluntary self-assessment by influ-
ences which resemble principled causes: strongly motivated lead-
ers preach tax-evasion techniques to large numbers of followers
who are predisposed to believe what they hear.s2 Therefore, those
who "participate in a scheme with a broad exposure" present the
same threat of spreading resistance to voluntary self-assessment
as do principled tax refusers, and perhaps a much greater threat
because of the pervasiveness of antipathy to taxes.53 As such, they
too receive special treatment from the IRS Illegal Tax Protester
Program.54
51. For a fascinating dialogue among Catholics about war-tax refusal, see Gar-
vey, Let's Stop Paying War Taxes, U.S. CATHOLIC, Mar. 1981, at 11. The lead
author contended that Christians have a religious obligation to refuse to sup-
port nuclear arms. This was followed by an opinion poll of readers on the
issue and readers' comments about Garvey's views. The IRS should find
comfort in the following letter. "I agree with Mr. Garvey in theory, but I am
not prepared to suffer the very real consequences of applying that theory. I
do not want to go to jail and be, therefore, unable to pay my bills which would
then become a burden to my family." Id. at 14 (letter of Marsha Ann May-
nard). The readership poll found that 48 percent disagreed that nuclear arms
are a necessary evil, but only 25 percent agreed with Garvey that Christians
should stop paying war-taxes.. Id at 13.
For opposing views among religious pacifists on whether Christians ought
to refuse to pay war-taxes, irrespective of the punishment issue, compare
Eller, A Tale That Will Tax the Imagination, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 506
(1981), with Brown letter, supra note 36.
52. See IRS Response, supra note 1, at 84 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.):
Initially the protester identification started because in many areas
these schemes were developed by individuals, promoted by people
who were more or less in the capacity of zealots. They gathered up
groups; they held lectures; they lectured people on everything from
constitutional law to every other subject, and so the tax "protester"
was attached because they were deemed to be doing this on the basis
that they were protesting the system and contending that people did
not have a legal obligation to pay taxes.
See also inf'ra § IILD.
53. '"The protest movement, because of its high visibility and potential for
spreading, poses a threat to the voluntary tax system." GAO REPORT, supra
note 35, at 57.
54. See infra § Il
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C. Types of "Schemes"
The IRS classifies returns it identifies as illegal protest returns
according to ten categories. 5 The following discussion is based on
those categories, but is restructured to reflect the fact that some of
the IRS categories relate to the ostensible motivation of the pro-
tester, and others relate to methods of nonpayment.
1. Justifications
a. Pacifism
In early 1982, Roman Catholic Archbishop Raymond G.
Hunthausen of Seattle, Wash., announed that he would withhold
half of his 1981 personal income tax to protest "our nation's contin-
uing involvement in the race for nuclear arms supremacy," and
that he would deposit the money in a fund for charitable, peaceful
purposes.5 6 The previous June the archbishop, whose archdiocese
included a nuclear submarine base, an Air Force base, an Army
55. The IRS began to identify and classify illegal tax protest returns in 1978. In
that year the Service identified 7,123 illegal tax protest returns (representing
7,661 individual taxpayers-joint returns were counted as one return by two
protesters). In 1979 there were 12,946 identified protest returns, and in 1980
there were 18,226. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 68.
For 1980 the IRS classified the protest returns as follows:
Schemes
Constitutional 5930
Family estate trust 4117
Church related 2784
Fair market value 196
Gold/silver standard 167
Nonpayment protest 643
Protest adjustment 533
Blank 1040/1040A 175
Other 1644
Total returns 16,189
Nonreturn items
Form W-4s (by protesters) 937
Correspondence 97
Total nonreturn items 1034
Total 17,223
(The total by scheme does not agree with the total returns identified because
of adjustments, such as counting only one of the two returns involved in a
family estate trust for scheme count purposes.) Id. at 48.
56. Lincoln (Neb.) Journal, Jan. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 3. The archbishop owed $250 to
the IRS. He enclosed a check for $125 with his Form 1040 and sent the other
half to an escrow account for the proposed World Peace Tax Fund. This Fund
would be established by a bill sponsored by U.S. Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Ore,
and would receive the military tax portion of taxes owed by conscientious
military tax objectors. McGrory, Archbishop joins the tax rebels, Lincoln
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post, and the headquarters of one of the nation's largest defense
contractors, had called nuclear arms "demonic weapons which
threaten all life on earth," urged unilateral disarmament, and
asked for citizens to refuse to pay fifty per cent of their federal
income taxes to protest defense spending.5 7 The next month, Seat-
tle leaders of the United Methodist and United Presbyterian
Churches and the United Church of Christ endorsed the Arch-
bishop's proposal,'and urged clergymen elsewhere "to give a simi-
lar call to action."58
The Seattle uprising was by no means the first episode of war-
tax refusal, even in recent years. Pacifists of various persuasions
have refused to support every war to date. Although the Illegal
Tax Protester Program is the first across-the-board effort to
counteract organized tax resistance, the Service had previously fo-
cused attention on tax protests against both World War II and the
Vietnam War.59
Until the 1940's, war-tax protest followed the Thoreau model of
purging individual conscience. "Pacifists who had refused histori-
cally to drop bombs on people concluded that they could not logi-
cally buy the bombs to let others drop them; through tax refusal
these pacifists tried to divorce themselves from all complicity with
the war-making effort."60 But after World War II, war-tax resist-
(Neb.) Journal, Apr. 16, 1982, at 6, col. 3; Mayer, No Buck; No Bang, THE PRo-
GREssrvE, Apr. 1982, at 40.
The alternative fund has long been a device used by principled war-tax
refusers to both promote their cause and remove any suggestion of greed as a
motive for their protest. During the Vietnam War, tax refusers paid into al-
ternative funds the monies they refused to pay to the government. The
funds, in turn, used the money to publicize tax and draft resistance and to
financially support resisters who lost employment as a result of their protest.
Tabac, supra note 45, at 216. The proposed World Peace Tax Fund is different
in that donations of tax money to the Fund would have official sanction and
would have the effect of a tax credit.
As McGrory, supra, pointed out, taxpayers who do not have the will to
follow Archbishop Hunthausen's example may join what she calls "the
wimp's tax revolt." By contributing to a charitable organization, the taxpayer
legally can keep at least some of her money out of government coffers by
taking a charitable contribution deduction, and can help whatever cause she
believes in.
57. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1981, § A, at 8, coL 1.
58. Id. Archbishop Hunthausen's stance caused sharp debate in his archdiocese,
but most letters to the chancery on the issue supported him.
The Rev. Joseph Emry told Catholic parishioners on July 13, 1981: "In
principle, we agree with the moral question of disarmament. But I say if you
disagree with his political action of IR.S. withholding, then you have the re-
sponsibility to come up with alternatives." Id
59. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 81 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
60. Tabac, supra note 45, at 216.
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ance organizations began to appear.6 1
However, even during the Vietnam War only a small number of
people actually practiced tax refusal.62 One commentator attrib-
uted this to taxpayer fear of criminal punishment, the pervasive-
ness of the federal tax lien, and the effectiveness of the
withholding system in leaving the taxpayer with little unpaid tax
to refuse.63 Even so, despite the barriers and consequences, there
exists an active dialogue among pacifists and sectors of the reli-
gious community about tax refusal.6 4
61. In 1947 the Peacemaker Movement, a tax refusing pacifist organization,
emerged out of the War Resister's League, a traditional pacifist group. By the
time of the Vietnam War, the Peacemakers had begun publishing informa-
tion on techniques for nonpayment of war taxes. Other peace groups also
promoted tax refusal as a war protest method. Id.
62. Id. However, one estimate put the number of telephone excise tax refusers at
100,000. The Peacemaker, Jan. 16, 1971, at 5.
63. Tabac, supra note 45, at 216-17.
The federal tax lien is not particularly troubling for those who refuse to
pay taxes as a matter of conscience. Even though the government eventually
collects the tax (with interest and, perhaps, a civil penalty), "[t]he signifi-
cance of the protest is found in the fact that the refuser is not paying it." Id.
at 217. On the other hand, withholding tightly circumscribes the potential for
refusing to pay taxes, and the threat of jail tends to drive borderline tax refus-
ers back to safer protest methods. Id.
64. See 23 CHRsTANrry TODAY 698 (1979) (debate within General Conference
Mennonite Church about whether to practice tax resistance as a denomina-
tion or leave it to individual conscience).
The debate revolves around two axes: whether tax refusal is religiously or
morally mandated and whether it is effective. On the former point, Eller,
supra note 51, views those who benefit from the secular economy (dealing
with the money changers) as hypocritical if they refuse to pay the govern-
ment (Caesar) what is due. The Brown letter, supra note 36, counters that no
taxes are due to the government for the blasphemous purpose of eradicating
all life on earth. As for the effectiveness of tax refusal, Brown posed an anal-
ogy: ' The right of conscientious objection to war has been granted precisely
because our forerunners in the faith willingly and nonviolently suffered for
their convictions." Id. at 838. In the same vein was the comment of a Quaker
in 1756 about why he would not pay the war-tax: "[A]lthough my part might
appear at best as a drop in the ocean, yet the ocean, I consider, is made of
many drops." Mayer, supra note 56, at 40.
Though not a tax refusal case, the recent conviction of Enten Eller illus-
trates the continuing strength of the link between religious belief and resist-
ance to national military policy. Eller, a member of the Church of the
Brethren, and the first person to be convicted of draft dodging since the Viet-
nam War, told the convicting federal judge, "God told me not to register," and
he continued to refuse to register with the Selective Service Administration
despite threats that the judge might stiffen his sentence. Tnhr, Aug. 30, 1982,
at 57. The parallel between draft refusal and war-tax refusal was also appar-
ent in the Government's methods of dealing with conscription dissension:
the Justice Department moved first against the most vocal and the "most ada-
mant" about refusing to register. Recognizing its inability to prosecute the
thousands of other non-registrants, the Government is sending warning let-
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b. Religion
Outside of the war-protest area, there is little principled reli-
gious tax protest.65 Rather, the problem in this category is with
phony ministers and bogus churches taking advantage of the fa-
vored tax treatment allowed to religion.66
The self-proclaimed bishop of the California-based Universal
Life Church, Kirby J. Hensley, claims to have ordained more than
ten million ministers.67 Says he, "If the Government is going to
give a free ride to Billy Graham, then why not let everybody par-
ticipate in these blessings?"68 Unknown numbers of people are
ters to all but 160 who were placed on a list of those targeted for prosecution.
Trm, Aug. 30, 1982 at 57. Consequently, as in tax protest prosecutions, see
infra notes 255-57, 262, 267, 278-79 & accompanying text, draft protesters have
asserted the defense of selective prosecution. But unlike tax protesters, one
draft resister was winning with this defense. David Wayte has had the
charges against him for refusal to register for the draft dismissed, in part be-
cause he was found to be the target of wrongful selective prosecution. NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
65. But see United States v. Carrol, 567 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1977) (held: the claim of
religious freedom is not a valid defense to criminal tax conviction). Accord
United States v. Cotton, 567 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1977).
Amish farmer Ed Lee challenged the requirement that he pay Social Se-
curity taxes for his employees. In 1965, Congress exempted self-employed
Amish men from paying Social Security taxes on religious grounds. See
LR.C. § 1402(g) (CCH 1982) (allowing members of "recognized" religious
sects adhering to "established" tenets opposing acceptance of public or pri-
vate insurance benefits for death, disability, retirement, or medical care (in-
cluding Social Security benefits) to waive all Social Security benefits in
exchange for exemption from the § 1401 self-employment tax). However, this
exemption does not cover Amish employees of Amish employers. Lee re-
fused to pay Social Security taxes for 30 Amish men who worked for him for
over eight years. Lee won in federal district court, Lee v. United States, 497 F.
Supp. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1980), but lost by unanimous decision in the United
States Supreme Court, United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982), rev'g, 497 F.
Supp. 180 (WD. Pa. 1980). See also infra note 117.
66. The Internal Revenue Code grants several tax benefits to religious organiza-
tions and ministers. Most notable is the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) exemption from
the income tax given to religious organizations (but subject to certain broad
restrictions, see infra note 75). This exemption protects church income from
levy and, under § 170, also allows contributors to validly exempt churches to
take charitable deductions for (generally) up to half of adjusted gross in-
come.
For ministers, § 107 excludes from gross income the rental value of a home
furnished to him or the rental allowance paid to him, if used for a home. Also,
ministers are exempt, under § 1402(e), from self-employment taxes.
Testamentary gifts to religious organizations are deducted from the gross
estate. LR.C. § 2055(a) (2). Similarly, gifts to religious organizations com-
pletely escape the gift tax. LR.C. § 2522(a) (2).
67. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1.
68. Mitchell, Tax-Haven Ministries Gain on L.I., N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1981, § 21, at
1, col 1.
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trying to reap the tax blessings. Because bona fide tax-exempt
religious organizations need not report their inc6me, or even tell
the IRS that they claim tax-exempt status,69 and because taxpay-
ers who claim charitable deductions for donations to religious or-
ganizations need not name which church received the donation,70
the IRS cannot detect fraud easily.
The IRS does not try to define what a "church" is. "We don't set
doctrine or dogma. If you are sincere in your belief, we will recog-
nize you as a church, even if you worship trees."7 1 A California
"church" leader agreed: "In this country, anyone can establish a
religion, no matter how nuts."7 2 Still, the fact that a "religious" or-
ganization has tax-exempt status as a church73 does not allow its
members to use it as a tax shield.74
The Internal Revenue Code requires that for a church to gain
tax-exempt status: (1) It must be organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious purposes; (2) no part of its net earnings may
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; (3) it
may not devote a substantial part of its activities to attempting to
influence legislation; and (4) it may not intervene in any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate.75
Mail-order ministry "churches" have been around for many
years, but it has been only since the mid-1970's that they have been
used extensively to evade taxes.7 6 The most publicized incident
occurred in 1976 when 200 of 236 residents of Hardenburgh, N.Y.,
69. I.R.C. § 508(c) (1) (A) (CCH 1982).
70. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of William J. Anderson).
71. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col 1 (quoting IRS spokesman Larry
Batdorf).
Belief in a supreme being is not required for a religious tax exemption.
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1957). See, Belief in Supreme Being Not Required For Religious Tax Exemp-
tion, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 417 (1958).
72. CRusTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 24, 1981, at 42, coL 2 (quoting Ted Swenson, Presi-
dent of the Mother Earth American Fellowship Church).
73. The Universal Life Church, which ordains ministers by mail, received an offi-
cial IRS exemption in 1976, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS 1057 (1978) (Publication 78),
after a federal judge in California ruled that it was entitled to tax exempt
status in Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D.
Cal. 1974).
74. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1. For example, the Rev. Sun Myung
Moon was convicted by a federal jury on May 18, 1982, for conspiring to de-
fraud the federal government and for avoiding payment of income taxes by
passing off a personal bank account as belonging to his Unification Church.
United States v. Moon, 81-CR-705 (D.N.Y. May 18, 1982). See Tell, Rev. Moon's
Litigious Month of May, Nat'l L., June 18, 1982, at 3, coL 1.
75. I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). The first two requirements are the pressure points used by
the IRS in attacking bogus churches.
76. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col 1.
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became Universal Life Church ministers and stopped paying fed-
eral income taxes.77 By 1980, the IRS had identified 2,784 church-
related illegal tax protest returns7 8 and estimated that some 10,000
mail-order ministers were evading taxes.7 9
c. Constitution
Constitutional "rights" are the most frequently asserted reason
for nonpayment on returns identified by the IRS Illegal Tax Pro-
tester Program.8 0 Arguments made by protesters in this category
include:
-Tax collection violates the fourth amendment right "to be se-
cure... against unreasonable... seizures."81
-Mandatory disclosure on tax returns violates the fifth amend-
ment prohibition of self-incrimination.82
-The income tax is unconstitutional because Ohio was not a
valid state at the time the sixteenth amendment was ratified.83
-The sixteenth amendment term, "incomes," includes only
profit or gain, not wages.84
77. Id. The town residents also claimed state property tax exemptions on their
private homes. In reaction, New York passed a law, N.Y. LAWs, ch. 738 (1978)
(amending N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 436), denying tax exemptions on prop-
erty owned by members of the clergy unless the property was held in trust
for the church. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the new law, and the
United States Supreme Court let the decision stand. Town of Hardenburgh v.
State, 52 N.Y.2d 536,421 N.E.2d 795,439 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1981), appeal dismissed,
454 U.S. 958 (1981). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3,1981, § 2, at 13, col 3; Nat'l LJ., Jan.
14, 1980, at 7, coL 2.
78. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 70.
79. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1.
80. See supra note 55.
81. Reiff v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1169, 1171 (1981); IRS Response, supra note 1, at 116
(statement of George Dixon, Committee for Constitutional Taxation); GAO
REPORT, supra note 35, at 16 (statement of William J. Anderson).
82. It is well settled that the fifth amendment does not establish a blanket privi-
lege negating any duty to file tax returns. United States v. Edelson, 604 F.2d
232 (3d Cir. 1979). Rather, there must be something peculiarly incriminating
about the refusal to file itself, United States v. Wolters, 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.
1981), or the taxpayer must rest his fifth amendment claim upon the incrimi-
nating nature of particular questions on the return, United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259 (1927). Nor may the taxpayer falsify his return in order to avoid
self-incrimination. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
Nonetheless, the fifth amendment claim is often asserted by protesters to
explain their failure to file or to report income fully. See, e.g., United States v.
Campbell, 619 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28, 30
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); IRS Response, supra note 1, at
110-11 (statement of Robert B. Graham, Sr.).
83. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of William . Anderson).
84. 'The income tax today is grossly misinterpreted. I do not have any income. I
do not have a profit or gain which the Constitution says I should have to pay
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-Federal Reserve notes do not constitute "income" and are not
legal tender because they are not redeemable in gold or silver.85
While the courts have repeatedly struck down these argu-
ments, 86 and they lack legal merit,87 the constitutional schemes are
difficult to stamp out because of the way in which they are spread.
A Nebraska example of the dynamics of tax protest is the criminal
prosecution of Alton R. Moss, a/k/a, John L. "Snoopy" Freeman.88
Snoopy Freeman was an itinerant tax protester and public
an income tax." IRS Response, supra note 1, at 116 (statement of George
Dixon, Committee for Constitutional Taxation). See also United States v. Ro-
mero, 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir 1981) (taxpayer's claim that he was not a "per-
son" and wages were not "income" held to be fatuous); United States v.
Buras, 633 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1980) (tax protester claimed nonpayment
was not willful because he believed "income" included only profit or gain, not
wages; held, defendant lacked sincerity because he had failed to declare gain
on sale of house).
85. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 41.
Courts have rejected this argument repeatedly. United States v. Jones,
628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981); United States v.
Benson, 592 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976). See also infra notes 119-120
and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Stonier v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1981). The petitioner was
assessed with deficiencies for four years and with penalties for failure to file
returns, I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1), negligence or intentional disregard of tax rules,
IR.C. § 6653(a), and failure to pay estimated income tax, IR.C. § 6654. Ap-
pearing pro se, he offered no evidence to counter the deficiency amount, rely-
ing instead on constitutional arguments. The Tax Court found some of these
arguments were "too incomprehensible to deal with or are too specious and
frivolous to justify specific attention." Id. at 1675. In the course of disposing
of such contentions as the unconstitutionality of the income tax, the Internal
Revenue Code, and the Tax Court and the court's lack of jurisdiction because
the petitioner had never voluntarily acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the IRS,
the court made this comment-
It is exasperating... that we must waste so much time listening
to and reading these repetitive arguments from self-proclaimed con-
stitutional lawyers who quote passages from the Constitution, the
Declaration of Independence, court opinions, the Bible, etc., all out of
context, that lead to nowhere in the pending case. The writer some-
times wishes that these protesters would get better lawyers or sales-
men to feed them the literature upon which their pleadings and
briefs are based, so that the arguments would be more comprehensi-
ble and interesting.
Id. at 1676, n.2.
87. See supra notes 81-85 & accompanying text. Among others, one argument
that has been shot down by the courts is that a prison sentence for willful
failure to provide information to the IRS was unconstitutional imprisonment
for debt, United States v. Douglass, 476 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1973).
88. United States v. Moss, Nos. CR 78-L-18, -20 to -23 (D. Neb. Sept. 29, 1978), afld,
604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). Hereinafter the
defendant will be referred to as Snoopy Freeman, as that is the name he pre-
fers. Record at 1, 6.
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speaker8 9 who travelled throughout the United States giving
speeches in which he challenged the constitutionality of the fed-
eral income tax laws and described ways to avoid federal withhold-
ing taxes.90 In late February 1978, the news director of KMMJ
Radio in Grand Island, Nebraska, which reached most of Nebraska
and parts of Kansas and South Dakota, invited Freeman to appear
on a live radio talk show to which listeners called in questions.9 1
On the program, Freeman called himself a "constitutional law-
yer."92 He said that the federal income tax was unconstitutional
and that it should not be paid.9 3 If listeners had refunds coming
for the year, they should file a tax return, but if no refund was ex-
pected, listeners should file a Form W-4 to claim exempt status. 94
Freeman spelled out a formula to use for claiming enough with-
holding allowances so that the employee would have no wages
withheld.95 Freeman said that if any listeners had problems with
the IRS, he would represent them for a fee.96 Freeman was on the
89. Amplification of Grounds (for motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255) at 2 (Nov. 6, 1980).
90. 604 F.2d at 570.
91. Record at 128.
92. Id. at 130, 158, 188, 234. Later Freeman admitted that he was not a member of
the bar-he had only a high school education-but said that bar membership
was not necessary to be a constitutional lawyer. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 130.
94. Id. at 234.
95. Id. at 130, 188-89, 235. The formula: To compute the number of exemptions
necessary to eliminate withholding, divide the highest salary for any single
year by $750, the size of one exemption in 1978. Id. at 235.
Under the withholding scheme of LR.C. § 3402, the employer is required to
withhold from "the amount of wages" a percentage set by the Secretary of
the Treasury. The term "amount of the wages" means the amount by which
the total wages exceed the number of exemptions multiplied by the amount
of one exemption (now set at $1,000; $750 before 1979). § 3402(a)-(b). The
employee may reduce the base wage upon which withholding is computed by
filing an exemption certificate. § 3402(f) (2). For periods in which no exemp-
tion certificate is in effect, taxes are withheld as if there were no withholding
exemptions. § 3401(e). In general, the employee may claim exemptions for
himself, his spouse, and each of his dependents, for such personal traits as
old age and blindness, and for a zero bracket amount allowance, unless his
spouse also claims the same exemptions. § 3402(f) (1). In addition, unless
claimed by his spouse, the employee may claim one exemption for each
$1,000 of itemized deductions (over the zero bracket amount) which he ex-
pects to claim for the year. § 3402(m). Freeman's formula exploits the self-
reporting aspect of the exemption certificate; the employee using this
formula attempts to reduce "the amount of wages" to zero by claiming
enough phony dependents or exemptions based on estimated itemized de-
ductions to completely offset gross wages, in violation of the prohibition
against claiming more exemptions than those to which the employee is enti-
tied. § 3402(2).
96. Record at 131.
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KMMJ program again in April and September 1978, and expressed
the same views.9 7
On March 6 he spoke to an audience at the Mid-Town Holiday
Inn in Grand Island. His message was much the same, and he re-
peated his advice about filing false Forms W-4. He told the audi-
ence to check out what he was saying by going to a Federal
Reserve Bank to try to exchange Federal Reserve notes for either
gold or silver.98 A month later Freeman addressed a two-and-a-
half hour meeting at Grand Island's Barr Junior High School, fol-
lowed by a similar meeting at a high school in nearby Hastings. 99
Listening to the first K1VIMJ talk show were several employees
of Van's Electric Company of Grand Island. One, Donald
Gronewold, attended the speech at the Holiday Inn; he and others
in the audience tape recorded Freeman's talk.10 0 Gronewold
played the tape for his fellow employees, after which Gronewold
and three others, including Dennis Vanosdall, a vice-president of
the company, filed false Forms W-4. Vanosdall claimed to be ex-
empt,' 0 ' and the others, following Freeman's formula, claimed
from twenty-two to thirty-two allowances. 0 2
Vanosdall and three others attended the Barr meeting, after
which Vanosdall invited Freeman to come to the Van's shop. Free-
man accepted; on April 8 he talked with the four who already had
fied and a fifth worker, Shawn Sanne. 0 3 Freeman told the em-
ployees that no one had ever gone to jail by following his system
for avoiding withholding and that everyone he had defended had
"gotten off."104 Also, Freeman would represent them for a retainer
fee of $2,000 if they got into trouble as a result of submitting the
Forms W-4, or, for $150, they could buy one year of "insurance" for
97. Id. at 132. The appearance on September 20 was just a week before Freeman
went on trial for five counts of aiding and abetting the filing of false Forms W-
4.
98. Id. at 218.
99. Id. at 191, 209. These public appearances were part of a series of anti-tax
speeches Freeman made in several Nebraska towns. Included was a news
interview shown on KNOP-TV in North Platte. I& at 142.
100. Id. at 160, 162.
101. IR.C. § 3402(n) eliminates the withholding requirement for wages of employ-
ees who certify that they incurred no liability for income tax for the preced-
ing taxable year and that they anticipate no income tax liability for the
current year.
102. Information, United States v. Spencer, No. CR 78-L-18 (D. Neb. June 20, 1978);
Information, United States v. Sanne, No. CR 78-1,20 (D. Neb. June 20, 1978);
Information, United States v. Lilienthal, No. CR 78-1.21 (D. Neb. June 20,
1978); Information, United States v. Gronewold, No. CR 78-L-22 (D. Neb. June
20, 1978); Information, United States v. Vanosdall, No. CR 78-123 (D. Neb.
June 20, 1978).
103. Record at 167, 191, 209.
104. Id. at 193.
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the same type of legal representation. 0 5 The employees chipped
in to pay Freeman $50 for his talk.106 Two days later Sanne filed a
Form W-4 declaring himself to be exempt from withholding.10
Each of the five Van's employees was charged with filing a false
Form W4,1A08 and Freeman was charged with five corresponding
counts of aiding and abetting the principal defendants.10 9 The
principal defendants agreed to plead guilty and to testify against
Freeman in exchange for fines of $100.110 Freeman was convicted
by a jury on all five counts and received five 1-year concurrent
sentences.'
The Freeman case illustrates a pattern the IRS has found else-
where around the country that threatens voluntary compliance
with tax payment "because of the visibility of the tax protest lead-
ers and their sales approach."112
2. Methods
a. Protest Adjustment or Nonpayment
A protest adjustment is an unallowable deduction, adjustment,
or credit declared on a tax return which otherwise correctly states
income and other information, where the adjustment is based on
philosophical objections to government policy or to how the gov-
ernment will use the tax money." 3 For example, a taxpayer may
105. Id. at 240-41.
106. Id. at 194.
107. Id. at 250.
108. IR.C. § 7205. The possible sentence may be up to $500, or up to a year impris-
onment, or both. The fine was recently boosted to a maximum of $1,000. See
infra note 239 and accompanying text.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The possible sentence is the same as for the principal
crime.
A sixth principal defendant, Joseph Baruch, an employee of a different
Grand Island construction company also was charged under L.RC. § 7205, and
Freeman was charged with a sixth count of aiding and abetting. However,
Baruch withdrew a guilty plea and was acquitted by a jury, thus voiding the
derivative charge against Freeman. United States v. Baruch, No. CR 78-L-19
(D. Neb. Nov. 9, 1978) (information against Freeman dismissed Nov. 20, 1978).
110. Judge Robert Van Pelt accepted the plea bargain Aug. 7, 1978.
111. United States v. Moss, No. CR 78-L-18, -20 to -23 (D. Neb. Sept. 29, 1978, ver-
dict; Nov. 20, 1978, sentence).
112. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of William J. Anderson). See
also Harsch, IRS handling autoworkers' tax protest circumspectly, Christian
Science Monitor, Feb. 25, 1981, at 4, col 1.
113. GAO REPoRT, supra note 35, at 19. A "new twist" to this technique has ap-
peared. Some taxpayers file what appear to be legitimate Forms 1040, but
closer scrutiny reveals that they have been altered. The taxpayer reports W-2
wages on the correct line, but adds a line to claim a large deduction labelled
"Non-Taxable Receipts" or 'Factor Discount Expense" or "Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189" (which in 1919 held that Congress could not tax stock
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take an impermissible deduction of half of her accurately reported
income for "conscientious objection to military expenditures."" 4
A protest nonpayment involves a correct computation of the
tax, but the protester refuses to pay al or part of the balance due
because of philosophical objections." 5 An example is Archbishop
Hunthausen's refusal to pay half of his income taxes as a protest
against the nuclear arms race.116
The protest nonpayment is the device best suited for principled
protesters. The morality of this type of protest remains unsullied
by dishonest reporting, and the purpose of the protest is high-
lighted for all to see (although "all" may be the clerks and investi-
gators at the IRS). Simultaneously, the honest nonpayer cuts
down his exposure to civil penalties and essentially eliminates the
danger of criminal conviction." 7
dividends without apportionment, despite the sixteenth amendment; the
Court narrowly construed the amendment to apply only to types of income
barred from unapportioned taxation before its passage). IRS Response,
supra note 1, at 94 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
114. E.g., Reimer v. Cormm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 518 (1981).
For an idiosyncratic example of a protest adjustment, though not fitting
the "illegal tax protester" definition because of the lack of potential for
spreading, see Jacobs v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 949 (1980), where the tax-
payer incurred a negligence penalty (though not a civil fraud penalty) when
she claimed excessive theft losses to draw attention to an alleged conspiracy
by the Mormon church and the local government to condemn her land.
115. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 42.
116. See supra notes 56-57 & accompanying text.
117. See Tabac, supra note 45, at 218-19, 221. However, the protesters who hold
back taxes cannot expect their high principles to gain them immunity from
taxation. The United States Supreme Court spelled this out clearly in a re-
cent unanimous opinion, United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982). The tax-
payer, Ed Lee, was a self-employed Old Order Amish farmer who employed
other Amish men to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop. For several
years Lee failed to file the quarterly Social Security tax returns required of
employers, withhold Social Security tax from his employees, or pay his share
of the Social Security taxes. The IRS assessed Lee more than $27,000 for back
employment taxes. Lee paid $91 of this, then sued for a refund. The federal
district court found that imposition of the Social Security taxes violated his
rights and his Amish employees' rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
first amendment, in light of the Amish aversion to accepting Social Security
benefits and to contributing to the Social Security system. Lee v. United
States, 497 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The Supreme Court reversed, refus-
ing to extend by judicial fiat the I.R.C. § 1402(g) provision exempting from
self-employment taxes those who claim a religious objection to Social Secur-
ity and declining to find that the burden on this bona fide religious belief
overrides the "very high" governmental interest in mandatory participation
in the Social Security system. Part of the Court's reasoning applies broadly
to principled tax protesters of any ilk.
The obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not funda-
mentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes; the differ-
ence-in theory, at least-is that the social security tax revenues are
[Vol. 61:681
TAX PROTEST EVANGELISM
b. Mail Order Ministry/Vow of Poverty
This scheme has two variations. Under the first, an individual
purchases ministerial credentials and perhaps a church charter
from a promoter. The person then forms an organization, or be-
comes a branch of another organization, and claims it to be a tax-
exempt church. The person's residence usually houses the
"church," and his or her family is usually the "congregation." The
person substantially reduces taxes by contributing up to 50 per
cent of his or her income-the maximum allowable-to the church
and claiming it as a Form 1040 deduction. The church's revenue is
used to pay the person's living expenses, such as food, transporta-
tion, and housing.
Under the second variation, a person takes a vow of poverty and
pledges to obey the orders of the church. The orders, in essence,
generally require the person to retain his or her current job and to
continue his or her existing lifestyle. The person may file a Form
1040 claiming income, but then takes an adjustment against gross
income for an equal amount. This adjustment eliminates any tax
liability. Some protesters show no financial data, stating that they
are not required to pay taxes as ministers under a vow of
poverty."18
The first such "church" to face criminal prosecution is an illus-
tration of the interconnections among tax protest schemes (other
than those motivated by principle). Jerome Daly is a "well-known
tax protester" from Minnesota who was convicted for failing to file
personal income tax returns for 1967 and 1968. In defense to those
convictions, Daly had claimed that declaring income violates the
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, and that his
income was worthless and not subject to taxation because Federal
Reserve notes are no longer backed by gold or silver. 1 9 The Mi-
segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program.
There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to dis-
tinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social
Security Act. f for example, a religious adherent believes war is a
sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified
as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a
similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the
income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments
were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.... Be-
cause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is
of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of
taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
102 S. Ct. at 1056.
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 40.
119. United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
An argument similar to Daly's fifth amendment claim was rejected in United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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" nesota Supreme Court disbarred Daly from practicing law be-
cause, in accord with his "strong belief that the Federal Reserve
System is unconstitutional," he demanded in lawsuits that his cli-
ents be paid in gold, and he asked a justice of the peace to declare
Federal Reserve notes to be illegal tender.120
According to federal prosecutors, in 1976 Daly gained control of
the Basic Bible Church of Minneapolis, which had an exemption
from federal taxes. He then sold packets which buyers could use
to claim contribution deductions or exemptions from taxation.I2 1
Daly claimed that the Basic Bible Church had 15,000 ministers
around the world,122 and that he was its "archbishop, president
and pope."'123
Daly's ministers used the church to shelter incomes of up to
$75,000 a year.124 One minister was a Texas International airline
pilot who was convicted in November, 1980, of felony tax evasion,
the first person claiming a religious exemption to be so con-
victed.125 In September 1981, a federal grand jury indicted Daly
and ten Braniff International airline pilots on 37 counts of tax
fraud.126
The basis for levying civil or criminal fraud penalties against
taxpayers using a church to shelter income is not that the church
is bogus, but because charitable contributions that inure to the
benefit of the contributor are not deductible.127 However, the con-
120. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, coL 1.
121. Nat'l LJ., Oct. 5, 1981, at 3, coL 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1981, at 6, coL 6. The
materials for creating ostensible churches sold for $750 to $1750 and included
forms for spurious vows of poverty, by which "ministers" could claim to tax
authorities that they had donated all property to the church and were person-
ally exempt from taxation. Id.
122. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,1981, § A, at 14, col. 1. Under Daly, the Basic Bible Church
had no members. Everyone was a "minister," and each "minister" was his
own "church." Id.
123. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1981, at 6, coL 6.
124. Id.
125. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1. Charles Kageler was sentenced to
four years imprisonment and fined $5,000. He signed over income of more
than $60,000 a year to his church after becoming a minister and taking a vow
of poverty in 1977. His house became a parsonage and the church made the
mortgage payments. The church also paid for a small aircraft he said he used
in missionary work. Id.
For a description of the government's strategy in mail order ministry pros-
ecutions-to concentrate on only a few test cases seeking criminal sanctions,
while imposing civil penalties in other cases-see GAO REPORT, supra note
35, at 36.
126. N.Y. Times, Sept 5, 1981, at 6, col 1.
For an examination of the growth of mail order ministry on Long Island,
N.Y., see Mitchell, supra note 68.
127. Natl L.J., Oct. 5, 1981, at 3, col 1.
In Rev. RuL 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69, the Service precluded charitable deduc-
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stitutional sensitivity of the IRS judging the sincerity of belief of
church members and investigating a church's use of its funds adds
to enforcement difficulties in this area.128 Added to this is the fact
that taxpayers who dodge taxes by use of a church-related scheme,
like those who invoke constitutional defenses, tend to be hard-core
protesters who fight enforcement efforts tenaciously.129
c. Family Trust
On the other hand, the family estate trust is the easiest scheme
to deal with, because the taxpayers using it often believe that it is a
valid tax avoidance device, rather than illegal tax evasion.130 The
taxpayers involved are persuaded to use the trust scheme by tax
advisors of the Snoopy Freeman genre.'13 Thus, although the tax-
payers are not tax protesters, the trust scheme presents a similar
danger of spreading due to the activities of the promoters. As
such, it has been one of the most widely used, and most heavily
promoted, evasion devices.132
tions under LR.C. § 170 for income earned by a typical mail order minister
and turned over to his "church," both because the church was not a qualified
§ 170(c) recipient (because it served private purposes) and because the con-
tributor expected to receive benefits in return for the contribution. Similarly,
the Service held in Rev. RuL 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26, that income assigned to a
church pursuant to a vow of poverty made by an attorney who was a member
of a religious order and who was instructed by his order's superiors to work
for a law firm must be included in the attorney's gross income because he
was an agent of the law firm, not of the religious order.
128. See Lauter, Are Churches Under Attack?, Nat'l J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, coL 1;
PROTESTER AcTIvrrY, supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1,
at 139.
The New York City Tax Commission recently discovered the difficulties of
trying to pierce the holy veil when the New York Court of Appeals over-
turned a commission ruling that the Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification
Church was too political to qualify for a property tax exemption. In re Holy
Spirit Assoc. for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 55
N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). The court held that the
government may not probe into a religion's own description of its beliefs un-
less such characterization is found to be a sham or lacking in good faith. Gov-
ernment agencies may not "go behind the declared content of religious
beliefs any more than they may examine into their validity." Id. at 521, 435
N.E.2d at 665, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
129. Tax protesters often are familiar with IRS compliance procedures and can
take advantage of the procedural safeguards to delay enforcement. Protes-
ters also have harassed and threatened IRS agents. PROTESTER AcTrvrry,
supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 142-44.
130. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of William J. Anderson).
See, e.g., Mirenda v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 666 (1980) (negligence pen-
alty upheld, even though taxpayer was unaware of IRS position on family
trust).
131. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of William J. Anderson).
132. U.S. NEws & Wom REPORT, March 30, 1981, at 80. See, e.g., Wenger v.
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The Government Accounting Office explained the scheme at a
congressional hearing as follows:
Under this scheme, a person purchases a "trust package" from a pro-
moter. All personal assets (the estate) are then assigned to the trust, and
any personal earnings become trust revenues. The promoters misrepre-
sent that (1) a grantor can assign his or her income to either another per-
son or a trust to escape taxation, and (2) -substantially all the grantor's
living expenses may be deducted on the trust's fiduciary income tax re-
turn as business expenses.
Under this scheme, the trust pays many personal expenses of the gran-
tor, such as housing, medical, automobile, and interest expenses. Any re-
maining trust income is paid to the grantor, who is a trust beneficiary; or
the trust income can be divided among several beneficiaries, such as the
grantor's minor children who have little or no income. The taxpayer files a
form 1041 showing these transactions and a form 1040 return showing any
distributions from the trust as income. Our review showed that most
users of this scheme attempted to divert personal earnings of between
$15,000 and $50,000 to the trust.13 3
A new variation on the family estate trust is the foreign trust
organization:
[A] n agent in a foreign tax haven country creates a trust in that country
and names the taxpayer as the trustee. The taxpayer transfers assets and
income-producing property to a number of other foreign trusts. Then,
through a series of sham transactions among the trusts, which are con-
ceived only for tax purposes, the taxpayer attempts to evade the income
tax.1 3 4
The trust schemes resemble other protester schemes in that
they often are spread by promoters for profit. However, the family
estate trust and, even more so, the foreign trust organizations pres-
ent a lesser danger of uncontrolled dissemination throughout the
taxpaying public in that they are relatively complex devices which
most taxpayers could not use without detailed advice from the pro-
moter (either in person or in a book). Thus, public speech alone
by an advocate of a trust scheme lacks the danger of provoking
imminent actions to evade taxes (unlike the W-4 scheme, which is
simple enough that public speech can lead directly to illegal
activity) .135
Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1615 (1981); Papp v. Com'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 25
(1981); Hovat v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 725 (1980).
133. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 39. See also Perkins, The Family Trust: Mira-
cle or Mirage?, CAsE & CoMMENT, March-April 1982, at 45. The Service has
various arguments for attacking family trusts, depending upon the varying
forms the trust instruments take. The major argument is that the grantor's
attempt to assign taxable income for personal services is ineffective, so that
even income (earned by the assignor) paid directly to the trust is taxable to
the assignor. Id. at 45-47. See Rev. Rul. 80-321, 1980-2 C.B. 33; Rev. Rul. 75-257,
1975-2 C.B. 251. See also Manual Transmittal 4200-418, LR.M. 426(26).4-(7)
(March 13, 1981).
134. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 78 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.).
135. See infra § fI.D. of text.
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d. False Form W-4
The incident which most dramatically brought home the fear
that tax protest could undermine the voluntary self-assessment
system was an organized revolt in early 1981 among Michigan blue-
collar workers, largely from the automobile industry. About 3,500
false Forms W-4 were filed with employers in order to gain exemp-
tion from wage withholding.136 One national news magazine as-
serted: "The tax protesters' massive challenge of this country's
self-assessment income tax is the first such test in the 68-year his-
tory of that levy."137 The New York Times called it a "burgeoning
tax revolt," and quoted a protesting truck driver. 'This thing is so
far gone there is no way the I.R.S. can keep up with it. Now that
this is out in the open, it's going like wildfire."13 8
The Commissioner of the IRS took a similar stance before Con-
gress: "This situation represents an erosion in compliance which,
if permitted to continue, threatens not only the withholding sys-
tem but also the reporting and collection of taxes." 39
However, the Michigan uprising apparently evaporated nearly
as quickly as did the Whiskey Rebellion.140 The IRS had detected
"a flurry of dubious tax advice" in the area as early as fall of 1980
and had alerted area employers.'41 When workers began filing
new Forms W-4 by the thousands, claiming special exemption or
scores of dependents, they were warned by their employers, and
the IRS sent a mass mailing of warning letters. More than half of
those who filed false forms quickly turned in corrected W-4's.142
Still, the incident was a startling example of what can happen
when a Snoopy Freeman-style protester143 develops a following
among already discontented taxpayers, especially those with con-
servative, anti-government biases.144
136. See supra note 112. See also NEWSWEEK, March 9, 1981, at 33; TIM, March 9,
1981, at 63; Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 24, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
For an explanation of how the W-4 scheme works, see supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
137. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 30, 1981, at 80.
138. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1981, § A, at 17, coL 1 (quoting Ed Marshall).
139. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 78 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
140. See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
141. Harsch, supra note 112.
142. Id. Two leaders of the Michigan tax revolt were convicted July 13, 1981, for
filing false W-4 forms. Dean Hazel, founder of We the People-American Citi-
zens Tribunal, was sentenced to two years imprisonment on two counts. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1981, at 10, col. 2.
143. See Harsch, supra note 112. The origin of the Michigan protest was in radio,
television, and personal appearances by Irwin Schiff a Connecticut "tax advi-
sor" who preached that "greenbacks" had no constitutional standing as legal
currency. See infra § .D. of text.
144. See infra § ILD. of text.
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The false W-4 scheme has the advantage (to protesters) of be-
ing simple and easy to use. Wage-earning protesters of any
strength of motivation may be attracted to it as a way to keep the
money out of the government's hands before they get a chance to
refuse to pay taxes. If they make it past the false W-4 stage,
protesters generally use another scheme to eliminate or evade
taxes altogether when returns come due.145
e. Blank or Protest Form 1040
The IRS includes in the blank 1040 category those returns
which contain only the taxpayer's name and address, and perhaps
a signature and Form W-2. No financial information is given, and,
upon correspondence, the taxpayer is revealed to be a protester. 4 6
The content of the protest may be anything discussed above. A
related method is included in the Service's "constitutional" cate-
gory: The taxpayer identifies on the return that he refuses to give
financial information for constitutional or other reasons. 147
These methods present enforcement problems not caused by
protest adjustment and protest nonpayment returns. On the lat-
ter, the correct information is included, so the Service can easily
assess a deficiency. However, blank returns and returns marked
"5th Amendment" give IRS paper shufflers little to go on. Delay
and expense are incurred as the auditors have to obtain the infor-
mation needed for assessment, a process frequently prolonged by
uncooperative protesters.148
f Nonfiling
The blank Form 1040 at least tells the Service who to investi-
gate. Nonfilers impose the greater burden of detection as a prereq-
uisite to enforcement. In 1979, the IRS had 450,000 uncompleted
145. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 40. See also Mitchell, supra note 68, at 7.
146. PROTESTER AcTIvrrY, supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1,
at 131.
147. E.g., Hatfield v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 895 (1977).
148. Leaders of the branches of the tax protest movement which object to the tax
system itself (as opposed to the use to which tax revenues are put) have be-
come familiar with IRS procedures and have learned how to use administra-
tive procedures to delay or defeat assessment of taxes due. These
procedures were developed to allow taxpayers and the Service to work out
differences administratively, if possible, in order to save time and expense for
all parties. However, illegal tax protesters often have no intention of arriving
at a fair and just resolution, so they take full advantage of such procedural
safeguards as notice periods and challenges to summonses. For a summary
of protester delay tactics and suggestions for improving procedures, see PRo-
TESTER ACTrvrry, supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at
144-55.
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nonfiling investigations, most of the leads for which were produced
by a newly improved document-matching program.149
Silent protesters are the most difficult to detect. It is impossi-
ble to say how many of the nonfilers detected by the IRS nonfiler
program would fit the protester category, and even more impossi-
ble to say how many more undetected nonfiling protesters there
are. But some nonfilers must be protesters, because protest lead-
ers encourage nonfling.150
A Nebraska example of how protest nonfiling works is the 1979
criminal prosecution of William R. Campbell.151
The owner of a farm near Chadron, Campbell was "an outspo-
ken advocate of political reform in the area of taxation" and was
active in a Panhandle tax resistance group known as "Posse Comi-
tatus."152 He had been convicted previously on several counts of
tax evasion in state court and now was charged with failure to efie
federal returns for 1974 through 1976.153 Among his defenses were
assertions that the Internal Revenue Code was unconstitutional,
that the fifth amendment relieved him of any obligation to file a tax
return, and that, in any event, he had misinterpreted the law in
good faith.15
One of the defenses Campbell failed to prove was that the gov-
ernment had selectively prosecuted him because of his exercise of
first amendment rights in speaking out against tax laws. He con-
tended that IRS agents engaged in such "clandestine operations"
as attending tax resister group meetings and recording names and
license numbers of those in attendance.155
Campbell was convicted on all three counts by a jury and was
sentenced to three consecutive one-year jail terms and fined $500
on each count. Judge Warren K. Urbom, who also had presided
149. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
See infra § -I.A. of text.
150. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of William J. Anderson).
151. United States v. Campbell, No. CR 79-L-06 (D. Neb. Aug. 8, 1979).
152. Consolidated Motions of Defendant at 2 (April 11, 1979).
153. LPRC. § 7203. The maximum sentence is one year and/or $10,000. Campbell,
like Freeman, claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction because the failure
to file (aiding and abetting filing of false W-4 in Freeman's case) was an 'ifa-
mous crime" under the fifth amendment, requiring a grand jury indictment,
and that Fed. Rule Crim. Pro. 7 to the contrary was unconstitutional. The
trial court rejected this, citing numerous decisions which had upheld Rule 7.
Memorandum (Judge Robert V. Denney) (May 29, 1979).
Campbell's 1974 return contained only his name and address; for 1975 and
1976 he filed no returns at all. He admited gross income for each year in ex-
cess of $10,000. United States v. Campbell. 619 F.2d 765, 766 (8th Cir. 1980).
154. 619 F.2d at 766.
155. Consolidated Motions of Defendant at 8 (Apr. 11, 1979). See infra § HILD. of
text.
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over Snoopy Freeman's trial,596 ordered that the sentence be
served in the county jail at Chadron, that Campbell be given imme-
diate work release rights, and that he be put on probation after the
first six months of imprisonment. The condition for the probation
was that Campbell "fie full, valid and timely federal income tax
returns during the period of probation" and pay the fine within 60
days of final judgment. 5 7 However, Judge Urbom revoked proba-
tion and ordered Campbell to serve the full three-year term, after
Campbell failed to pay the fine on time.158
D. Tax Protest Group Dynamics
Campbell represented a variation of the theme seen in such
cases as those involving Freeman, Schiff,159 and Daly.160 The latter
three were promoters from the outside who sold their anti-tax
ideas for profit to individuals and groups who were predisposed to
accept the sales pitch. Campbell, on the other hand, was a second-
tier protest leader with roots in the community where the ultimate
consumers lived. Such local leaders as Campbell and Dean Ha-
zel' 6 ' preserve and propagate the ideas coming in from the outside,
thus increasing the potency of the anti-tax message and cementing
the commitment of the local followers.
This is what Commissioner Egger meant when he told a House
Hearing that protester leaders were "preaching a gospel."162 Such
spreaders of the faith as Freeman, Daly, and Schiff are like travel-
ling religious evangelists. They are persuasive public speakers
whose sermons in a particular community are sponsored by local
fellow believers. The locals drum up interest; the evangelist gains
156. See supra notes 88-111 & accompanying text.
Willie Dee Morris, the Montana attorney who represented the sixth princi-
pal defendant in the Freeman case (who backed out of the plea bargain and
was acquitted), also represented Campbell at trial. Campbell filed his appeal
brief pro se. Morris also has represented other tax protesters. See IRS Re-
sponse, supra note 1, at 108 (statement of Robert B. Graham, Sr.).
157. Sentence, United States v. Campbell, No. CR 79-L-06 (D. Neb. Sept 14, 1979).
The Eighth Circuit upheld the terms of probation against a fifth amendment
challenge. United States v. Campbell, 619 F.2d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 1980).
158. Order, United States v. Campbell, No. CR 79-L-06 (D. Neb. Sept. 26, 1980). A
Government Accounting Office study of IRS efforts against illegal tax protest-
ers noted that courts often condition probation in criminal cases upon a re-
quirement that the defendant pay taxes and fie returns. IRS procedure
requires coordination among the Criminal Investigation Division, the Collec-
tion Division, and probation officers to ensure that the terms of probation are
being met. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 53.
159. See supra note 143.
160. See supra notes 119-126 & accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 47 & 142.
162. See supra note 49 & accompanying text.
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new converts at the revival meetings; then the local ministers con-
solidate the gains among the new recruits and capitalize on the
reaffirmed faith of the reinspired old guard.
The Michigan tax revolt followed the evangelism model in sur-
prising detail. In 1977, Irwin Schiff, who operated a tax advisory
service in Connecticut, was interviewed on network television.
This led to a local radio call-in show in Michigan. A preexisting tax
resistance club in Pontiac, named We the People (American Citi-
zens Tribunal), along with other local groups, spread Schiff's
message in the Flint and Pontiac area by sponsoring tax advice
meetings and helping to distribute Schiff's "tax liberation kit,"
which consisted of tapes and pamphlets and sold for $35. A young
autoworker, Dean Hazel of Pontiac, became the spokesman and
philosopher for the local group, and justified the tax revolt with
anti-Communist rhetoric. Even when Schiff went to jail for failure
to fie a proper return, his Michigan supporters interpreted the
conviction as an IRS attempt to undermine their protest move-
ment through harrassment, and they pressed on with the W-4 re-
volt.163 Then, when the government moved to stamp out the revolt,
the hard-core faithful went to jail for their beliefs, while the less
committed abandoned the movement. 64
Thus, close examination of the dynamics of tax protest reveals
a surprising similarity between different types of schemes and be-
tween the seemingly contradictory motivations of different types
of protesters. Every scheme appears to have evangelists, hard-
core followers, and fringe followers (all of whom have some claim
to principle), along with unprincipled tax evaders who use the
same schemes for pecuniary gain.
It may be argued that such constitutional protesters as Camp-
bell and Hazel actually lack principle and are merely using consti-
tutional and political arguments to rationalize greed. 165 However,
they share with the war-tax refusers a willingness to sacrifice for
163. Harsch, supra note 112. At about the time that the IRS began to strike back
at the Michigan protesters, Schiff lost his appeal of an earlier conviction for
willful failure to fie under I.R.C. § 72b3, and began to serve a six-month jail
term. He also was fined $10,000. See Kreig, Jury convicts tax-rebellion leader;
Schiffturns Conn. trial into 2-week spectacle, Nat'1 L.J., June 23, 1980, at 9, col.
1.
164. See supra note 140 & accompanying text.
165. While IRS officials recognize that tax protest is a form of social protest, they
do not see it as legitimate social protest. "Some of it is just making money for
the people that run around peddling these schemes." IRS Response, supra
note 1, at 87 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.). See also id. at 19 (statement
of William J. Anderson) ("[M]ost folks seem to have a streak of larceny in
them. When you look at the compliance statistics today, it seems to be very
much a function of how likely IRS is to catch them.")
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their beliefs and an eagerness to publicize their tax resistance
which cannot be explained by greed alone.
III. IRS RESPONSE
A. Identification of Protesters for Special Treatment
The IRS's reason for being is to collect taxes when they become
due. To accomplish this, the Service sometimes finds it necessary
to give special attention to certain types of taxpayers166 or to par-
ticular types of economic activities167 which pose collection
problems against which the normal compliance procedures work
poorly. In general, the special effort devoted to such problem areas
reaps collection benefits beyond the cost of the extra effort.16 8
However, the special efforts to deal with tax protesters are not cost
effective.169 Rather, the extra costs are justified by the fear that
tax protest, if left unchecked, will grow.17 0
The special effort tailored most tightly to the fear that an anti-
tax gospel could undermine the tax system is the Illegal Tax Pro-
tester Program established in November 1978 to identify and con-
trol protester returns and documents.'71
166. A recent example of a special IRS target was the independent contractor. See
McClaughry, Uncle Sam's War on the Independent Contractor, 31 NAT'L REv.
1609 (1979); BusiNEss WEEK, July 23, 1979, at 61. The Service persuaded Con-
gress to broaden information reporting to include payments made by busi-
nesses to independent contractors in remuneration for services. 1982 Tax
Act, supra note 18, § 312(a) (adding ILR.C. § 6041A).
Another target is bartering. The IRS in 1980 began a Barter Exchange Pro-
ject, as part of its larger Unreported Income Program, to enforce its view that
barter is taxable income. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-8
I.R.B. 15. See IRS Crackdown on Barter Business, 68 A.B.A. J. 410 (Apr. 1982).
To aid this effort, Congress included in the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, a
provision, section 311(a) (1) (amending I.R.C. § 6045), defining barter ex-
changes as "brokers" subject to information reporting requirements as to
capital gain transactions of their clients.
167. An example is the special audit program for partnership tax shelters. See
Comment, Auditing Partnership Tax Shelters: IRS Procedures and Taxpayer
Liability, 60 NEB. L. REv. 564 (1981).
168. See The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 55 (letter of Lauralee A. Mat-
thews, assistant IRS comissioner) (answer to Question 2).
The Service expects to recoup $21 to $22 for every dollar it spends trying to
collect overdue taxes. Christian Science Monitor, Oct 6, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
169. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 15-16 (statement of William J. Anderson). But
see id. at 103 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.) (return in recommended tax
and penalties per staff hour was greater in fiscal 1980 and early 1981 for tax
protest cases than for regular income tax examinations; however, actually
collecting the tax is more costly).
170. Id. at 104 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.)
171. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of William J. Anderson). In 1980
the Illegal Tax Protester Program at the district office level consumed 304
staff years, about 1 percent of the estimated 24,000 average total staff years
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Illegal tax protester returns are identified by several means.
The key to the program is the normal pipelines at the ten service
centers. The current IRS Commissioner described the protester
program as follows:
The initial detection of illegal protester-type documents usually is
made in the returns processing area of our service centers and then re-
ferred to a team under the control of the Compliance Division of the serv-
ice center. This team, which receives suspected protester returns and
documents from the returns processing area prior to processing, then de-
termines which returns or documents are considered part of illegal pro-
tester activity.
Indications of protester-type activity initially detected in a district of-
fice will be referred to the district illegal tax protester coordinator. These
may subsequently be referred to the service center for processing .... 172
Frequently, the return itself reveals the filer to be a protester,
as when the return contains only the filer's name and address or
when the return is inscribed, "No Nukes," and the enclosed check
covers only half of the accurately stated tax liability. However,
protesters who are less eager to broadcast their causes (or who
lack any cause other than their own money belt) may have to be
detected through other means. One ripe source in recent years is
the Questionable Form W-4 Program begun in April 1980 which re-
quires employers to report to the IRS any W-4's they receive which
claim ten or more withholding exemptions or which claim total ex-
emption.173 As illustrated by the Michigan tax revolt and the
Snoopy Freeman case, many of the false exemption claimants fit
the illegal tax protester definition.
Another identification source is the Information Returns Pro-
gram, which attempts to identify taxpayers who underreport in-
come or who fail to file returns. This is done by using computers to
match returns against information documents from such sources
as employer payrolls, bank records of payments of interest, and
records of payments of corporate dividends.174 Although this pro-
expended by the districts on all compliance enforcement activities, and cost
$8.1 million. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 44.
172. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.).
It is crucial that the return processors in the service centers identify tax
protest returns as they are coding them for the computer; otherwise the IRS
may issue any claimed refund, causing collection problems if the filer turns
out to be a protester who refuses to pay taxes. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at
46. About two-thirds of all returns identified in 1978 and 1979 were picked up
first by the service centers. Id.
173. Id. at 13 (statement of William J. Anderson). The IRS may instruct employ-
ers to ignore W-4 exemption claims the Service determines to be false, and
the employers may not then honor new W-4's unless they meet specified cri-
teria. GAO REPORT, supra noie 35, at 48.
174. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 81 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.). The
Information Returns Program has improved significantly in recent years, al-
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gram does not itself identify tax protesters, follow-up inquiries
may attach the protester label.
In some cases the Service may not know it is dealing with
protesters until an audit occurs. Fewer than two percent of indi-
vidual returns are audited each year, 7 5 but the odds of a tax
evader being audited (aside from special identification programs)
are somewhat greater than that. This is because audits are se-
lected according to the Discriminant Function System (DIF), a
complex (and top-secret) computer program which flags returns
for examination if the individual values of certain factors fall
outside normal ranges.176
The DIF selective audit differs from the likely public perception
that the Service audits at random. However, there is a random au-
dit program called the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Pro-
gram; every few years the Service randomly selects a certain
though it began in the 1960's. For tax year 1978, the Service received about
one-half billion information returns, about 88 percent of which were filed on
magnetic media. The IRS used about 77 percent of the reported information
to match against more than 90 million individual income tax returns received
that year. Id. Still, the Service is not receiving all of the information docu-
ments required to be filed, especially those relating to payments made to in-
dependent contractors. For example, a 1980 congressional hearing took
testimony that several federal departments, including the IRS and GAO,
were not filing forms (Form 1099) to report payments to nonemployee in-
dependent contractors, as required by LR.C. § 6041(a). Federal Noncompli-
ance, supra note 10.
The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, expands information reporting require-
ments to several new areas. Payors of intrest and dividends, newly required
to withhold after June 30, 1983, also will have to file related information re-
turns. Sections 303, 304 (amending I.R.C. §§ 6042, 6044, 6049). Brokers (in-
cluding barter exchanges and real estate agents) are required to report the
gross proceeds of their client's transactions. Section 311(a) (1) (amending
I.P.C. § 6045). Trades and businesses which make payments for services of
over $600 a year to independent contractors and to direct sellers of consumer
goods must file information returns. Section 312 (adding new LIRC. § 6041A).
State and local governments must report income tax refunds made by them.
Section 313(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 6050E). Large food and beverage retail-
ers (with 10 or more employees and where tipping is normal) are required to
report annually (a) gross receipts from sales of food and beverage; (b) the
amount of charge receipts; (c) the total of tips on the charge receipts, and
(d) employee-reported tip income and mandatory service charges of 10% or
more. Section 314 (adding new LR.C. § 6053(c)) (effective Apr. 1, 1983). Re-
porting requirements for interest are expanded somewhat. Section 309
(amending I.R.C. § 6049).
175. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
176. The Discriminant Function System (DIF) is used in a preliminary analysis of
every return. It assigns weights to various items selected for scrutiny as the
result of a study of mistakes, omissions, and average deductions in returns
from previous years. The DIF score changes each year as the IRS emphasis
shifts. Returns with high DIF scores are flagged for review by an agent, who
decides whether to conduct an audit. MoNEY, Feb. 1979, at 74.
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number of returns, perhaps 50,000, for audit and requires the au-
dited taxpayers to justify every line of their returns. The purpose
is to check what people report against what they should report, so
that the Service may fine-tune the DIF and other mathematical for-
mulas used to detect noncompliance. 77
Because the audit programs are based on filed returns, the
Service must use other means to detect nonfilers (whether or not
they are protesters). The IRS does have a special program to try to
detect nonfilers, drawing many of its leads from the Information
Returns Program; those nonfilers who reveal themselves to be tax
protesters are included in the Illegal Tax Protester Program. 7
8
Once the return or other document is identified as coming from
a tax protester, it is classified as either processible or non-
processible. According to the Commissioner.
The nonprocessible have primarily included the blank forms 1040 and the
constitutional schemes. In these cases the taxpayer is notified by regis-
tered mail that the return is not acceptable. If an acceptable return is
subsequently received within 30 days, it is sent back to returns processing
for regular processing.
If there is no reply or another protest return is received, the returns
and any related prior returns or collection activity information is referred
to the Criminal Investigation Division of the district where the taxpayer
resides. Cases ultimately found to be lacking prosecution potential are
referred to the district Collection and Examination Divisions for review
and follow-up.
177. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Jerome Kurtz);
Multiple False Filings, supra note 17, at 17; McClaughry, supra note 166, at
1610.
The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) began in 1964.
One would expect it to be the best long-term measuring device for both the
underground economy and tax evasion. Indeed, between 1965 and 1973 the
TCMP found reporting rates for small proprietors to have fallen from 79.2 per-
cent to 57.2 percent. Id. at 1611. However, from 1964 to 1979 the TCMP
showed only a "very modest" decline in overall compliance, which could be
harmonized with the hypothesis of a large and growing underground econ-
omy by theorizing that growth in the underground economy has occurred
largely in areas undetected by the TCMP, such as illegal income and nonfil-
ing. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Jerome
Kurtz).
178. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of William J. Anderson); The Un-
derground Economy, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). See
also, Petrie, How the IRS detects unreported income, 54 Wis. B. BuL. 8 (Nov.
1981).
The improved results from the Information Returns Program left the
nonfiler program with some 450,000 uncompleted nonfiling investigations in
1978. Id.
The Collection Division routinely attempts to determine if persons de-
tected by the nonfiler program are protesters. CoMMisSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, IRS ComMENTs ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED, "ILLEGAL TAx PRoTEs-
TERS THREATEN TAx SYSTEM," Recommendation 1 (Sept. 3,1981) [hereinafter
cited as IRS COmmENTS], reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 157.
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In the case of the processible returns, these have primarily included
returns for the other types of schemes which typically reflect income but
claim clearly unallowable deductions or credits for protest reasons, and
which identify the omission of a portion of the income or tax for protest
reasons. In these cases, the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Branch at
the service center determines whether the return has potential for crimi-
nal action. If not, the returns are forwarded to the appropriate division-
that is, Examination or Collection of the district where the taxpayer re-
sides for review and followup.
Each concerned division in the district--Criminal Investigation, Exam-
ination and Collection-has established procedures for handling these
cases. For example, in the Criminal Investigation Division returns will be
evaluated within 15 workdays of their receipt and, if selected for investiga-
tion, will be designated as priority cases. In the Examination Division,
referred returns will be considered priority cases and an examination will
be begun within 90 calendar days of their receipt.
17 9
At each service center is a team which controls the counting
and analyzing of illegal tax protester returns. The team compiles
relevant information, requisitions prior year returns, and forwards
everything to the appropriate district office.180 Protester returns
are flagged for speedy handling at the district level,l8 l where they
are channelled to the appropriate divisions.
Identification of a return as a protest return not only subjects
that return and prior year returns to special scrutiny, but subse-
quent year returns also are targets. The Examination Division, as
part of all examinations of protest returns, will inspect subsequent
year returns to determine whether they too require examination,
or, if no return was filed in a subsequent year, the examiner will
secure a return or prepare a substitute return based on informa-
tion from other sources. 182 Effective in July 1982, taxpayers identi-
fied as tax protesters in one year are subjected to annual
computerized delinquency checks to ensure continuing
compliance.1
8 3
B. Civil Penalties
The IRS has a sizeable storehouse of statutory weaponry to use
against protesters. The deficiency assessment merely covers what
the taxpayer owed anyway. On top of this the IRS may stack civil
penalties to compensate it for the extra work necessary to collect
the unpaid tax.184 The relevant penalties, 8 5 which are set by the
179. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
180. IRS Comn~mNTs, supra note 178, Recommendation 5, reprinted in IRS Re-
sponse, supra note 1, at 161.
181. Id., Recommendation 6, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 162.
182. Id., Recommendation 4, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 160.
183. Id.
184. See Tabac, supra note 45, at 220.
185. Strictly speaking, "penalties" are only those fines imposed in §§ 6671 to 6699
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Service subject to judicial review, include:
Interest. The most automatic consequence of not paying taxes
by the due date is that interest begins to build up on the unpaid
amount until the tax is finally paid.186 Until 1969, the interest rate
was a modest six percent-not a particularly onerous deterrent to
the early war-tax refusers who were protesting the Vietnam War.
However, Congress has added a late payment penalty of one-half
percent per month for each month that the taxpayer refuses to pay
the amount shown.1 87 During the 1970's, the interest rate was
raised to try to keep pace with inflation. The current law sets a
self-adjusting interest rate of ninety percent of the commerical
prime interest rate during September,188 but the 1982 Tax Act
changes the formula as of 1983 so that the rate is adjusted semian-
nually according to the prime rate over the preceding six
months. 89
Failure to File Tax Return or to Pay Tax. On top of interest,
the tardy taxpayer is liable for other interest-like civil penalties.
Section 6651 creates three additions to the tax which can be used
in different ways. An individual who fails to fie an income tax re-
turn by its due date may be subject to an added tax (nonfiling pen-
alty) of five percent of the amount required to be shown on the
return for each month the return remains unfiled, up to a twenty-
five percent limit. 9 0 Separate from that is a one-half-of-one-per-
cent monthly surcharge (first nonpayment penalty) on the amount
shown on a return if the amount shown is not paid on time; this
also builds up monthly, as long as the amount shown remains un-
of the Code. Fines imposed by §§ 6651 to 6659 are called "additions to the tax"
and "additional amounts." For present purposes, the term, "civil penalty,"
will be used to refer to either.
186. LR.C. § 6601(a).
187. LR.C. § 6651(a) (2) (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. I No. 91-172,
§ 943(a), 83 Stat. 487, 727 (1969)). Previously § 6651 imposed additions to the
tax for failure to fie a return, based on the amount required to have been
shown on the missing return. However, the only penalty for tardy payment of
the tax shown on a return was six percent interest. The 1969 amendment
raised the effective interest rate to 12 percent.
188. LRLC. § 6621(b) (CCH 1982).
Section 6621 also sets the interest rate for the § 6654 addition to the tax for
underpayment of estimated tax by an individual.
189. 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 345(a) (amending LRC. § 6621(b)). Also, sec-
tion 344(a) adds a new IR.C. § 6622 that requires that interest accruing after
1982 be compounded daily.
190. I.R.C. § 6651 (a) (1) (CCH 1982). In response to a recent study showing that it
costs the IRS about $75 to identify a taxpayer who fails to file a return, the
1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 318, added a minimum penalty for extended
failure to file without reasonable cause. For failure to file for 60 days after the
due date (with extensions) the minimum penalty is the lesser of $100 or the
amount of tax due.
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paid, to a twenty-five percent limit.191 A third tardiness penalty
(second nonpayment penalty) is figured according to the same
formula as the penalty for failure to pay the amount shown.192 It is
based on the amount of tax required to be shown on the return but
not shown, if the tax is unpaid within ten days of notice and
demand.193
The total nonfiler would be liable for the nonfiling penalty auto-
matically and for the second nonpayment penalty if payment is not
made within ten days after notice and demand; however, because
all of the nonfiling penalty would be attributable to the tax for
which the notice and demand is made, only the nonfiling penalty
would be owed.194
A protesting purist, who fully discloses income and honestly de-
clares deductions and exemptions, but who simply fails to pay
taxes he admits he owes, would have no liability for the second
nonpayment penalty (based on taxes now shown on the return),
but would be subject to the first (based on taxes shown). Because
he filed promptly, neither would the purist owe the nonfiling
addition.195
A late but honest filer would be subject to the nonfiling penalty
and the first nonpayment penalty (for failure to pay the amount
shown), but would be able to reduce the late filing penalty by the
amount of the late payment penalty for the months in which both
apply.196
The taxpayer who files late, underreports tax due, pays the
amount shown sometime after he files, and ignores a deficiency as-
sessment for more than ten days will be liable for all three penal-
ties, although they will cover differing time periods and will be
based on differing amounts.19 7
191. I.R.C. § 6651(a) (2) (CCH 1982).
192. See supra note 191 & accompanying text.
193. I.R.C. § 6651 (a) (3) (CCH 1982).
194. I.R.C. § 6651(c) (1) (B) reduces the maximum amount of the § 6651(a) (3) pen-
alty by the amount of the penalty under (a) (1) which is attributable to the
tax on which the (a) (3) penalty is based. For the total nonfiler, both penal-
ties are based solely on taxes required to be shown but not shown, assuming
the taxpayer ignores the 10 day notice and demand.
195. The protest purist, however, cannot avoid all penalties for nonpayment. Each
of the § 6651 penalties carries an exception if "such failure is due to reason-
able cause and not due to willful neglect." The courts have turned aside
claims that reasonable cause not to file or pay on time includes the unconsti-
tutionality of the tax system (or at least the taxpayer's good faith belief along
those lines), or the government's intention to do immoral things with the tax
money. See, e.g., Muste v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 913 (1961).
196. I.C. § 6651(c) (1) (A) (CCH 1982). See Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(f), Example 2
(1973).
197. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(f), Example 1 (1973).
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The moral of section 6651 is to file early and pay early. 98 And, if
you intend to withhold taxes in protest, fie your return on time
and declare all taxes honestly, even if you do not pay them.
Failure to File Certain Information Returns. Payers of divi-
dends,199 patronage dividends by cooperatives, 200 and interest 20 '
aggregating $10 or more during a calendar year are required to efie
information returns reporting such payments. Failure to file such
returns leaves the nonreporting payer liable for a penalty of $10 for
each unfliled statement, up to a limit of $25,000 for any calendar
year.202
A different approach is taken for tips received in the course of
employment. Employees are required monthly to report to their
employers all tips received during the previous month if they total
$20 or more.2 03 An employee who fails to make such a written
statement to his employer is liable for an addition to the tax equal
198. I.R.C. § 6651(b) encourages tardy taxpayers at least to make installment pay-
ments on unpaid tax debts. The basis on which all three penalties are figured
is reduced each month by the amount paid that month. Also, the base taxes
on which the (a) (1) and (a) (2) penalties are assessed are reduced by the
credit claimed on the return, e.g., taxes withheld at source.
199. I.R.C. § 6042(a) (1) (CCH 1982).
200. IJC. § 6044(a) (1) (CCII 1982).
201. I.R.C. § 6049(a) (1) (CCH 1982).
202. I.R.C. § 6652(a) (CCH 1982). The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 309, boosted
the annual maximum to $50,000 and added to the section 6652(a) penalty, the
new information returns for interest and dividends withholding required by
amended section 6049. These information returns are needed to make the
document matching of the Information Returns Program work properly.
Also, knowledge by taxpayers that their interest and dividends are being re-
ported likely increases the rate of voluntary reporting of the same income.
For example, an IRS study of unreported income for 1976 (part of the Tax-
payer Compliance Measurement Program) found that the reporting rate for
dividends, which was subject to information reporting alone, was 84 to 92 per-
cent. By contrast, the reporting rate for wages and salaries, subject to both
withholding and information reporting, was 97 to 98 percent, and the rate for
self-employment income, subject to neither, was 60 to 64 percent. The Under-
ground Economy, supra note 3, at 2-3 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). Worse
still, recent studies have found that only 16% of tip income is reported. Con-
cise Explanation of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,1982
P-H FED. TAXES 163 (Report Bull. No. 36, 2d Extra Issue, Aug. 23, 1982).
In addition, LR.C. § 6652(b) imposes $1 penalties for failure to file a miscel-
lany of other information returns, up to a yearly total of $1,000.
203. I.R.C. § 6053(a) (CCII 1982). The required written statement triggers the em-
ployer's duty to collect Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes
based on tips, I.R.C. § 3102(c) (CCH 1982) (unless the IRS has authorized the
employer to estimate tips and collect taxes based on the estimates, IR.C.
§ 3102(c) (3) (CCH 1982), and to withhold income taxes from wages, I.I.C.
§ 3402(k) (CCH 1982)). See also Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a) (16)-i (1969); Treas.
Reg. § 31.3401(f)-1 (1969); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(k)-l(a) (1970).
In a 1976 revenue ruling, the Service tried to require employers to report
tips of employees charged by customers on credit cards, but Congress sus-
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.to half of the tax on the unreported tips imposed by the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).204
Failure to Pay Tax. Aside from section 6651, failure to pay tax
can result in substantial penalties, based on a percentage of the
underpayment.205 Section 6653 includes two varieties of underpay-
ment penalties: (1) underpayment of income taxes imposed by
the Code due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and
regulations, but without intent to defraud, giving rise to a penalty
of five percent of the underpayment,206 and (2) fraudulent un-
derpayment of taxes required to be shown on a return, resulting in
a penalty of fifty percent of the underpayment.207 The fraud in-
volved need concern only some part of the underpayment for the
entire underpayment to be subject to the fifty percent penalty.208
But if the fraud penalty is assessed, the negligence penalty and the
section 6651 delinquency penalty are displaced.20 9
The distinction between fraud and negligence frequently is an
issue in tax protest cases. Here again, the purity of the protester's
motives and methods may save him from the hefty fraud penalty.
The essence of fraud is concealment with intent to deprive the gov-
ernment of taxes, so the simple refusal to pay a tax candidly ac-
knowledged to be owing is not fraud.210
Tax protesters most often run afoul of the negligence penalty
by violating the clause penalizing intentional disregard of rules
and regulations (but without intent to defraud).21l The negligence
pended its implementation. The Underground Economy, supra note 3, at 8
(statement of Jerome Kurtz).
204. LR.C. § 6652(c) (CCH 1982). This penalty on the § 3101 FICA tax (or the
§ 3201 Railroad Retirement Tax Act levy for railroad employees) is considera-
bly less burdensome than it would be if it were based instead on the income
tax imposed on the tip. The FICA tax rate for 1982-84 is 5.4 percent. LR.C.
§ 3101(a) (5) (CCH 1982).
205. The "underpayment" is the deficiency defined in LILC. § 6211(a) (CCH 1982),
except that the tax shown on a return may be taken into account in offsetting
the amount of tax imposed only if the return was filed on time. LR.C.
§ 6653(c) (1) (CCH 1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1 (1978).
In the context of principled protest, the deficiency upon which the penal-
ties are assessed would be the difference between what the taxpayer recog-
nizes he owes and what he admits he owes, where the taxpayer's return is
accurate but he claims to owe only part of the amount he legally owes; the
difference is the amount he protests paying. Penn Mutual Indemnity Co., 32
T.C. 653, affd, 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960); Tabac, supra note 45, at 220 n.17.
206. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (CCII 1982).
207. LR.C. § 6653(b) (CCH 1982).
208. Id. The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 325, applies the 50% penalty not only to
the entire underpayment (as under the old law), but also to interest payable
on the portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud.
209. Id.; LR.C. § 6653(d) (CCH 1982).
210. Muste v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 913 (1961); see Tabac, supra note 45, at 219-21.
211. E.g., Seigler v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1265 (1979) (§ 6653 (a) penalty im-
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clause is more likely to be invoked in the family trust cases, where
the taxpayer may have honestly believed the scheme was legal,
but was negligent in not consulting a lawyer or accountant.21 2
The fraud penalty, on the other hand, generally requires some-
thing more heinous than mere failure to file a return for a year in
which the IRS finds taxable income,2 13 or mere delay in payment
because the taxpayer is annoyed with the government.2 1 4 Fraud
usually is found where it appears that the taxpayer is trying to
dodge taxes, rather than just making the IRS work harder for the
money.21 5
Aiding Tax Understatement. A new penalty added by the 1982
Tax Act is aimed at Snoopy Freeman-style tax "advisers." Any
person who directly aids or abets in the preparation of any portion
of a tax document, knowing it will be used under the revenue laws
and will cause a tax liability understatement, is subject to a $1,000
penalty for each such return or document ($10,000 if the document
is that of a corporation).216
Frivolous Returns. Another provision new with the 1982 Tax
Act slaps tax protesters with a flat $500 penalty for filing a "frivo-
lous" return.217 A return is "frivolous" if it does not contain infor-
posed where taxpayer reported only fair market value of Federal Reserve
notes as income); Farr v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 908 (1979) (penalty for
intentional disregard where taxpayer underpaid taxes because he objected to
the tax collection system); Reimer v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 518 (1981)
(§ 6653(a) penalty imposed where taxpayer took deduction for his "conscien-
tious objection to military expenditures").
212. E.g., Mirenda v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 666 (1980); Dombrowski v. Comm'r,
40 T.C.M. (CCH) 697 (1980); Taylor v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1980).
213. Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1963); First Trust & Say. Bank
v. United States (Estate of Kraftmeyer), 206 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1953). But see
Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1958) (fraud penalty imposed on
taxpayer who failed to file returns solely because he disapproved of the way
the government was run, and did not believe in paying income taxes); Stoltz-
fus v. United States, 398 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1968)
(prolonged failure to file is not enough alone to establish fraud, but it is per-
suasive evidence of attempt to defraud).
214. Jones v. Comm'r, 259 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1958).
215. E.g., Sutherland v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 963 (1980) (long-term under-
statement of income and nonfiling sustained fraud penalty; complaints about
state of society and government and taxpayer's assertion that she had to
evade taxes to survive held irrelevant); Cook v. Comn'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH)
1334 (1980) (fraud assessed where taxpayer filed false withholding certificat-
es first claiming 12 exemptions, then claiming 99, and finally claiming total
exemption).
216. 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 324 (adding new LR.C. § 6701).
217. Id. § 326 (adding new I1C. § 6702). Both the new aiding or abetting penalty,
see supra note 216 & accompanying text, and the frivolous return penalty are
subject to review by the federal district court if the taxpayer, within 30 days
after assessment, pays 15% of the amount and files a claim for refund. Collec-
tion actions are stayed until the court acts. The burden of proof as to the
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mation from the face of which the correctness of the tax liability
can be determined, or if it contains information that, on its face,
shows the amount of tax calculated is substantially incorrect. The
conduct must be due to a frivolous position or an intent to delay
the administration of the tax laws.
Assessable Penalties. In addition to the additions to tax and in-
terest discussed above, the Code imposes a number of other civil
penalties, some of which are relevant to tax protesters.
One such penalty cannot be applied directly to the protester,
but is still important to the effectiveness of protest schemes. "Any
person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed" by the Code, who willfully fails to do so or who "will-
fully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the
payment thereof" is liable for the total amount of the tax evaded or
not paid over.218 For example, an employer whose employee is in-
volved in a false Form W-4 scheme would be liable under section
6672 (a), while the employee would be liable for a civil penalty (in
addition to any criminal penalty) of $500 for understating wages or
overstating itemized deductions in claiming a withholding allow-
ance.2 19 Due to the section 6672 penalty, the employer has incen-
violation is on the IRS. 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 322 (adding new I.R.C.
§ 6703).
218. I.R.C. § 6672(a). This penalty applies to the person who is obligated to collect
and pay over the tax imposed on another person, not to the person directly
taxed. Treas. Reg. § 301.6672-1 (1957). The most obvious group affected would
be employers who are obligated to withhold and pay over income, FICA, and
FUTA taxes. The effects are to boost the incentive for the employer to com-
ply with the withholding obligation, even though the employer himself may
sympathize with the employee's protest, and to diminish the effectiveness of
the protester's refusal to pay a tax already in government hands. This factor
may drive a determined protester, if he is willing to risk heavier civil and
criminal penalties, to file a fraudulent withholding exemption certificate in
order to keep the government from receiving the tax before the protester has
a chance to refuse to pay it.
Although the employer or other person liable under this section is also
liable for other penalties (such as the penalty for failure to file information
returns, see supra notes 199-204), he is not liable for the negligence or fraud
penalty under § 6653.
219. LR.C. § 6682(a) (CCH 1982). Section 306(a) of the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18,
amends this provision to include false statements and exemption certificates
with respect to newly required withholding of interest, dividends, and pa-
tronage dividends. The penalty does not apply if, inter alia, the false state-
ment does not result in a decrease in the amount withheld. Formerly, the
penalty applied only to claims of withholding exemptions under
§ 3402(f) (1) (F), allowing one $1,000 withholding exemption for every $1,000
worth of estimated itemized deductions, as defined by § 3402(m), and it did
not apply to inflated claims of withholding allowances based on such other
factors as number of dependents. But the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 721(a), 95 Stat. 172, 341 (1981), broadened the cover-
age to all claims of allowances or exemption under § 3402 (resulting in a de-
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tive to encourage honest reporting from the employee.
Tax protesters are also beginning to feel the bite of a penalty
which may be assessed by the Tax Court when the court finds that
the taxpayer has instituted proceedings before it "merely for de-
lay."2 20 The penalty currently may run as high as $500,221 thus of-
fering discouragement to low income protesters who would be
little deterred by the ad valorem penalties.
New with the 1982 Tax Act is a provision allowing the Tax Court
to award to the prevailing litigant reasonable litigation costs, lim-
ited to $25,000. The United States cannot receive such costs as a
prevailing party, and the prevailing party can recover only costs
allocable to the government. Also, the winner must prove that the
government's position was unreasonable.22 2
Other assessable penalties include $5 for failure to supply an
identifying number in a return or other document,2 3 and $5 for
failure to include on the return the taxpayer's place of
residence.2 4
C. Criminal Penalties
A magazine headline recently read, 'Tax Protesters Get Return
Fire From Uncle Sam."2 5 To draw out the analogy, the civil penal-
crease in taxes withheld, where the employee lacked a reasonable basis for
the statement) and raised the penalty from $50 to $500.
220. I.R.C. § 6673. The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 292(b), liberalized the ground
for imposing the penalty by allowing it if the court finds that the taxpayer
brings or maintains the proceedings "primarily for delay or that taxpayer's
position in such proceedings is frivolous or groundless. ." This takes ef-
fect for cases brought after Dec. 31, 1982.
This penalty, basically unchanged since the 1939 Internal Revenue Code,
has been little used until the recent wave of tax protest began to clog the Tax
Court. In Hatfield v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 895 (1977), the court announced that it
would give "serious consideration" to imposing § 6673 damages in such frivo-
lous cases as when the taxpayer claims receipt of Federal Reserve notes is
not reportable as income. This promise was fulfilled in Senesi v. Comm'r, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 143 (1981), where a protesting couple was socked with the full
$500 penalty on top of a $203 deficiency and a $10.15 penalty for neglecting to
pay. The Senesi's had refused to pay because of their conscientious objec-
tion to the use of their taxes to promote war and violence. Accord Ballard v.
Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 465 (1982). See also U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP.,
March 30, 1981, at 80; Lincoln (Neb.) Journal, Jan. 7, 1982, at 6, col. 2; Nat'l L.J.,
Sep. 20, 1982, at 3, coL 4.
221. The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 292(b) (amending I.R.C. § 6673) boosts the
penalty to $5,000 for cases beginning after Dec. 31, 1982.
222. 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 292(a) (adding new I.P.C. § 7430). This award is
available in civil actions started after Feb. 28, 1983, and before Dec. 31, 1985.
223. I.R.C. § 6676(a) (CCH 1982). The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 316, increases
the penalty to $50 per failure, but sets a $50,000 yearly maximum.
224. I.R.C. § 6687(a) (CCH 1982).
225. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., March 30, 1981, at 80.
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ties discussed above are the light arms in the IRS arsenal, and the
criminal penalties are the heavy artillery. The maximum fines rel-
evant to protesters range from $1,000 to $10,000, and the maximum
sentences range from one year to five years.
The focal point of the Illegal Tax Protester Program is the Di-
rector of the Criminal Investigation Division, who gives priority to
protest cases.226 The statutory weapons are:
Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax. Section 7201 of the Code is the
most imposing deterrent to some types of tax protest. On top of
other penalties, "[a] ny person who willfully attempts in any man-
ner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
thereof' may be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to five
years or both.227 The government must prove (1) a substantial de-
ficiency for the year involved;22 8 (2) affirmative acts of wrongdo-
ing;229 and (3) willfulness. 230
226. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 98 (statement of Roscoe I Egger, Jr.). During
the 30 months preceding April 1, 1981, the Division began 1,151 criminal inves-
tigations of illegal tax protesters and recommended prosecution in 548 cases.
During this period there were 141 trial convictions and 124 pleas of guilty or
nolo contendere. Of those convicted and sentenced, 55 percent received
prison terms that averaged 12.1 months. Id.
227. I.R.C. § 7201. Upon conviction, the defendant also is liable for the costs of
prosecution. A similar provision is contained in § 7203, which punishes will-
ful failure to fie a return or pay tax. William Campbell, see supra notes 151-
58, was convicted on three counts under § 7203, sentenced to three 1-year
terms, and fined a total of $1,500. Prosecution costs, mostly witness fees and
travel expenses, added up to nearly $1,600, and were charged to Campbell.
The § 7201 fine goes up to $100,000 under the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18,
§ 329, for individuals and up to $500,000 for corporations.
228. The government is not required to show the amount of tax unreported,
Graves v. United States, 191 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1951); Stinnett v. United
States, 173 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1949), but case law has imposed the requirement
that the underpayment of tax be "substantial." United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 503 (1943); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942). But whether the
facts of specific cases fit the "substantial" description is relative. Canaday v.
United States, 354 F.2d 849, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1966). Generally, the courts have
been able to juggle the figures to find the deficiency to be "substantial." E.g.,
Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960) (tax due was $134 for one
year and $264 for each of two other years in question, but this was found to be
"substantial" because the percentage of tax evaded was 20 percent the first
year and 37 percent the other two years). Thus, the taxpayer who fails to
report a small amount is wiser to defend on the grounds of ignorance, in-
advertance, or mistake, rather than try to claim the deficiency was not
substantial.
229. The difference between felony tax evasion under § 7201 and misdemeanor
failure to fie a return or to pay the tax lies in the affirmative action implied by
the term, "attempt," in the felony statute. Willful, but passive, neglect of duty
might constitute a misdemeanor, but the addition of a positive attempt to
evade or defeat the tax lifts the offense to a felony. United States v. Spies, 317
U.S. 492 (1943).
Among the acts qualifying as affirmative willful attempts are "keeping a
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Willful Failure to Collect or Pay Over Tax. Section 7202 is the
criminal counterpart of the section 6672(a) civil penalty applied to
those obligated to collect and pay to the government taxes owed by
others;2 3 ' the only difference in language is that the criminal stat-
ute does not include the clause that provides for the punishing of
willful attempts to evade or defeat such taxes. 232 The penalty is up
to five years imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000, or both, plus
costs of prosecution.2 33
double set of books, concealment of assets or covering up sources of income,
handling of one's affairs to avoid making reports usual in transactions of the
kind," id. at 499, use of fictitious dependents, Koontz v. United States, 277 F.2d
53 (5th Cir. 1960), and filing a false return, Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373
(1957).
230. One authoritative definition of "willfulness" is the voluntary, intentional vio-
lation of a known legal duty, requiring more than careless disregard for truth,
but less than a bad faith motive. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
See also United States v. Pomponio, 439 U.S. 10 (1976). But see Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492,498 (1943) (felony evasion requires "some element
of evil motive and want of justification in view of all the financial circum-
stances of the taxpayer"). The leading case defining willfulness, dealing with
the forerunner of ILR.C. § 7203, is United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933):
The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But, when used in a
criminal statute, it generally means an act done with a bad purpose
... ; without justifiable excuse... ; stubbornly, obstinately, per-
versely.... The word is also employed to characterize a thing done
without grounds for believing it is lawful.. ., or conduct marked by
careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act ....
Id. at 394-95.
Negligence or carelessness is not enough to establish criminal intent,
Grant v. United States, 184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950), but a consistent pattern of
underreporting will support willfulness, United States v. Frank, 437 F.2d 452
(9th Cir. 1971).
Ignorance of the law is a defense to prosecution under § 7201, and negates
the willfulness element in failure to perform the legal duty, United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th
Cir. 1956); United States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1952), but the defend-
ant carries the burden of proving his ignorance, Edwards v. United States, 334
F.2d 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1964). However, willfulness
may be shown by disclosure of efforts of the taxpayer not to learn what his
tax obligations are, United States v. Fahey, 510 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974), or by a
"conscious purpose to avoid enlightment," United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d
1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
231. See supra note 218 & accompanying text.
232. LR.C. § 7202 (CCH 1982). This omission is logical, because the § 7201 prohibi-
tion on attempts to evade or defeat "any tax" covers attempts by one person
to evade or defeat the tax of another, and the penalty in each statute is the
same.
233. I.R.C. § 7202 (CCH 1982).
Other criminal statutes which may affect employers and other third party
obligors include failure to supply, or supplying, a false Form W-2 to an em-
ployee, LR.C. § 7204 (CCH 1982) (one year and/or $1,000); and failure to com-
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Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax.
Section 7203 imposes a fine of up to $10,000 or a jail term of up to a
year, or both, on anyone who willfully violates a requirement to
pay a tax or estimated tax, to file a return, to keep records, or to
supply information at the time required.2 34 Government policy is
to charge tax protesters with misdemeanor failure to file even
when felony evasion occurs or false returns are filed,235 so tax pro-
test cases frequently turn up under section 7203, especially those
involving constitutional protesters.2 6 The peculiarities of the con-
stitutional scheme have provoked controversy over what consti-
tutes a valid return for purposes of the statute.237
Fraudulent Withholding Exemption Certificate. The branch of
tax protest receiving the most press recently has involved filing
ply with the § 7512(b) (CCH 1982) requirement for separate accounting of
taxes collected and paid over on behalf of another, I.R.C. § 7215(a) (CCH
1982) (one year and/or $5,000).
234. I.R.C. § 7203 (CCH 1982). This sanction is in addition to any other penalties,
civil or criminal, which may attach. A taxpayer may be convicted for the
same act under §§ 7201, 7203, and 7207 (filing fraudulent tax return) without
violating the constitution. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965). But
see United States v. Coppola, 425 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1969). The willfulness stan-
dard for § 7203 is the same as for the § 7201 felony statute. United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973). Here again, while a good faith misunderstanding
of the tax laws may negate willfulness, good faith disagreement with the law
does not. United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1979) (tax protester's
conviction of willful failure to file a return upheld); United States v. Ware, 608
F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 329, boosts the maximum fine to $25,000
for individuals and to $100,000 for corporations.
235. United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980).
236. E.g., United States v. Tecton, 539 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1976) (willful failure to file
found where defendant published a book acknowledging his failure to file be-
cause he believed the Internal Revenue Code to be unconstitutional); United
States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976) (willful failure to file upheld where
defendant's return contained no relevant information, but was inscribed,
"Fifth Amendment. Go to Hell; do not pass go; do not collect $200 dollars");
United States v. Fahey, 411 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957
(1969); United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
904 (1970); United States v. Acker, 415 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
958 (1969).
237. The taxpayer in United States v. Long, 618 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1980), filed a re-
turn containing zeros in the spaces for exemptions, income, tax, and tax with.
held. The court held that this was a valid return (falsity aside), althougi
blank spaces would have made it invalid. Because it was a valid return, thl
taxpayer was not guilty of willful failure to file. The court in United States
Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), took an opposite view, and held that
similar return was not valid under § 7203 because the defendant was not tr'
ing to file an accurate return. The Long approach would force the gover
ment to charge such protesters with felony evasion, LR.C. § 7201, or feloi
false return, LR.C. § 7206.
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false Forms W-4 with inflated exemptions. 238 In response, Con-
gress raised the penalty for willfully supplying to employers false
information on withholding exemption certificates from $500 and/
or one year to $1,000 and/or a year imprisonment.23 9
Fraud and False Statements. Section 7206 imposes a felony
penalty of three years and/or $5,000, plus prosecution costs, for a
variety of fraudulent declarations.240 The most relevant are
(1) willfully making a written declaration in a return, statement, or
other document under penalty of perjury which the declarer does
not believe to be true as to every material matter,24 1 and (2) will-
fully aiding or advising the preparation of a return or other docu-
ment under the tax laws which is fraudulent or materially false, no
matter whether or not the person being assisted knows of the
falsity.242
Fraudulent Returns, Statements, or Other Documents. Section
7207 imposes a penalty of one year and/or $1,000 on anyone who
"willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary any list, return, ac-
count, statement, or other document, known by him to be fraudu-
238. See supra § ILC.2.d.
239. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 721(b), 95 Stat. 172,
341 (1981) (amending LR.C. § 7205). The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 306(b),
expanded the I.R.C. § 7205 liability to cover the new withholding rules, i.e.,
willful filing of a false exemption certificate or failing to cancel an obsolete
certificate under § 3452(f) (1) with respect to dividends and interest withhold-
ing.
The misdemeanor penalty is in lieu of any other penalty, except that of
I.R.C. § 6682, see supra note 219 & accompanying text; United States v. Wil-
liams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981). The section applies to any individual re-
quired to supply information under LR.C. § 3402 who willfully supplies false
information or who willfully fails to supply such information, thus causing an
increase in tax withheld under § 3402.
It is no defense that the employee was dramatizing opposition to govern-
ment policies, United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 970 (1973), or bad laws, United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.
1976), or the tax system, United States v. Stephen, 569 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1978).
Convictions have been upheld where the employee has claimed 20 depen-
dents, Shea v. United States, 506 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1974), 30 to 50 dependents,
United States v. Hinderman, 528 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1975), and 99 exemptions,
United States v. Hudler, 605 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980) (the taxpayer believed "99" was a computer method of symbolizing tax
exempt status and would result in zero withholding, although neither the em-
ployer nor the IRS recognized such a code). However, an employee who
claimed three billion dependents was acquitted because the claim was so
completely implausible, and because he explained his protest in a letter.
United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
240. The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 329, increases the fine to $100,000 for indi-
viduals and to $500,000 for corporations.
241. IR.C. § 7206(1).
242. LR.C. § 7206(2).
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lent or to be false as to any material matter .... ,24 The most
obvious utility of this section is to deter taxpayers from supplying
doctored documentation of their tax claims. But another possible
use would be to punish sympathetic employers who forward to the
IRS withholding certificates from their employees which they
know to be false.
Failure to Obey Summons. The IRS has the broad power to
summon taxpayers and record holders to appear for testimony and
to produce records.2 4 Any duly summoned person who fails to ap-
pear may be fined up to $1,000 and/or jailed for up to a year, and
may be charged for prosecution costs. 245
Interference with Administration of Internal Revenue Laws.
Use of force or threats of force to attempt to intimidate or impede
federal agents acting under authority of the Internal Revenue
Code may net the offender a felony penalty of three years and/or
$5,000, except that the penalty is only one year and/or $3,000 where
the offense involves threats of force alone.24 This section is a pos-
sible answer to Commissioner Egger's complaints about harass-
ment of IRS agents by tax protesters.247
Non-Code Crimes. Aside from the criminal statutes of the In-
243. The fine was raised to $10,000 for individuals and to $50,000 for corporations
by the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 329.
244. See LR.C. §§6420(e)(2), 6421(f)(2), 6424(d)(2), 6427(h)(2), 7602, 7603 &
7604(b).
245. I.RC. § 7210 (CCH 1982).
246. LR.C. § 7212(a) (CCH 1982).
247. See IRS Response, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.):
For example, employees have been harassed by telephone, receiv-
ing abusive or obscene calls at home at all hours. The mails have
similarly been used for harassment. Unwanted merchandise may
also be ordered for delivery to the employee at home and a request
made that the employee be billed. Pornographic materials have been
ordered as well as every conceivable form of merchandise including
subscriptions to magazines, record and book clubs, etc. Harassment
has even carried over to employers who are trying to carry out our
new W-4 regulations. In one recent case an employer representative
passing out notices explaining the W-4 requirements was told he
might "disappear" if he continued.
In some parts of the country, more rural than urban, protester resistance
has turned violent, especially when seizure of property for nonpayment of
taxes was involved. Often protesters take advantage of conferences with IRS
agents to stage mass demonstrations, where groups of 5 to 20 protesters will
descend on the IRS office and will confront the agent with verbal harassment
and veiled threats. Tax protest publications sometimes mention IRS employ-
ees in an "uncomplimentary fashion." PROrSTER Acrrvrry, supra note 25,
reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1, at 142-43.
For a colorful account of similar confrontations with government officials
from the perspective of the harassers (though in the context of welfare rather
than taxation), see Wolfe, Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers, reprinted in T.
WoLFE, RADIcAL CmC & MAU-MAUING THE FLAK CATCHERs, 95-153 (1970).
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ternal Revenue Code, tax protesters also have been charged under
the general criminal statutes prohibiting aiding and abetting, 248
and conspiracy.249 Both of them relate back to the tax crimes,
which are the principal offenses. An example of this is the convic-
tion of Snoopy Freeman for aiding and abetting the filing of fraudu-
lent withholding exemption certificates by several of his
followers.250
D. IRS Strategy
Two shock waves hit IRS policymakers in the late 1970's and
early 1980's. First, statistics from the new Illegal Tax Protester
Program seemed to show that the number of identified protesters
nearly tripled from 1978 to 1980.251 While one obvious explanation
for this increase is that program statistics tend to be cumulative in
nature (protesters identified the first year stay on the rolls for an-
nual audits while new protesters are identified by improved detec-
tion methods the second year, and so forth), the interpretation of
many, including the Congressional overseers25 2 and the press,2 5 3
has been that the tax protest movement has been growing. Sec-
ond, the increase in protesters known to the Service has been ac-
companied by a number of highly publicized 'tax revolts," most
prominently the one among Michigan auto workers, in which the
leaders brazenly challenged the government's ability to punish the
lawbreakers.254
The Service's reaction has been to emulate Marshall Matt Dil-
lon holding off a lynch mob on the jailhouse steps: "I'll shoot the
first man who takes a step forward."255 Rather than challenge pro-
test groups en masse, the Service has taken a more selective ap-
proach. While several members of the Posse Comitatus in
Chadron, Nebraska, likely were equally guilty of failure to file re-
turns and failure to pay taxes, the government selectively prose-
cuted one of the leaders,25 6 and hoped that this would deter the
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
250. See supra notes 88-111 & accompanying text.
251. GAO REPORT, .supra note 35, at 68.
252. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal,
Chairman, Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm.).
253. E.g., U.S. NEWS & WomD REP., March 30, 1981, at 80.
254. See supra notes 136-39 & accompanying text.
255. One observer used a different analogy: "The truth is... that the IRS's en-
forcement power has deteriorated. Like the Wizard of Oz, who hid his timid-
ity behind a screen, the IRS tries to disguise its own limited enforcement
capabilities by playing up a reputation for toughness." TnE, March 9, 1981 at
63.
256. See supra notes 151-58 & accompanying text.
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rest in the future. In the meantime, by taking names and license
numbers at anti-tax rallies, the Service puts attendees on notice
that their tax returns will receive special scrutiny.
The strategy is to demoralize those who already are protesters,
by guaranteeing annual audits, interest, and civil penalties, and by
prosecuting their leaders and enough of their fellow believers to
bring home the reality of criminal punishment. By doing this, the
Service hopes to cast a chill on those who have not yet joined the
tax protest movement.257
The Service's early warning system picked up signs of protest
activity in Michigan. This allowed the Service to warn area em-
ployers and to prepare to strike back once the insurrection be-
gan.2-8 The Service already had in effect new regulations that
required employers to report W-4's which contained claims of un-
usually large numbers of allowances. Thus, the IRS was able to
tell the employer to ignore potentially fraudulent Forms W-4.259
However, withholding is the foundation of the collection sys-
tem. Dean Hazel and the auto workers were striking at the Serv-
ice's strong point. The revolt was easily detectable and was
vulnerable to swift suppression-the government already had the
taxes, by way of withholding and the cooperation of the employers.
Therefore, the Service's success in Michigan should not be genera-
lized to other types of protests.
Playing to its strength, the IRS convinced Congress, after sev-
eral tries, to extend the withholding requirement to dividends, in-
terest, patronage dividends, and payouts from qualified retirement
plans, 260 and to stiffen information reporting and penalties related
to withholding.261
The Service has adapted its surgical-strike strategy to church-
related schemes, concentrating for the moment on a few major
court challenges of the more blatant mail order ministers.262 But
257. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of William J. Anderson).
The difficulty of the Service's task in deterring protesters is shown by the
early results of the Illegal Tax Protester Program. A GAO study of the pro-
gram focused on 167 cases identified as protesters in three IRS districts in
1978-79. This random sample was projected to a universe of 3,870 protesters
in those districts. Id. at 2. Of the 3,870, five hundred sixty-seven filed a pro-
test return for 1979, the year after the Service started investigating them, and
928 did not fie at all in 1979. Id. at 6.
258. See supra notes 140-42 & accompanying text.
259. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 78-79 (statement of Roscoe L Egger, Jr.).
260. 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, § 301.
261. Id. §§ 309, 306(a), 306(b). See IRS Response, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of
Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
262. See supra note 125.
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because of the sensitivity of the issues involved, the potential for
chilling and demoralizing bogus churches is severely limited.
Here the other aspect of the Service's strategy is more effective:
publicity. The IRS Public Affairs Office has committed a dispro-
portionate amount of its resources to countering tax protest
schemes. 26 3 The tactic taken has been to inform the public about
the IRS's position on such issues as family trusts and vows of pov-
erty. There may be more potential in targeting specific pockets of
noncompliance with information countering particular claims by
protest leaders.264 The Service has asked for Congressional per-
mission to publicize tax returns of protest leaders, as a way to dis-
credit their sales pitches.265 Even without revealing return
information, the Service could pursue this course more
aggressively.2 66
The IRS strategy of deterrence is motivated by a fear that a few
well publicized examples of successful tax resistance could build
protesters' confidence in their ability to beat the system and could
draw a snowballing number of previously compliant taxpayers into
the protest movement. Thus, the normal economic considerations
of tax enforcement are distorted by the unmeasurable costs to the
tax system of the feared degeneration of voluntary compliance.
The Service acknowledges that the Illegal Tax Protester Program
is "enforcement-oriented more than revenue-oriented." 26 7
The main problem with the deterrent strategy is the limited ca-
263. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of William J. Anderson).
264. PROTESTER AcTrrry, supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra note 1,
at 140-42.
265. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1981, at 69.
IR.C. § 6103 generally bans disclosure of tax return information other than
to specified categories of officials who have a need to know. However,
§ 6103(k) (3) allows disclosure of any information about specific taxpayers to
the extent necessary to correct misstatements of fact about the taxpayers'
returns or transaction with the IRS. But such disclosure may be made only
following approval by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation.
266. See PROTESTER AcTr=Vr, supra note 25, reprinted in IRS Response, supra
note 1, at 142; USA TODAY, June 1981, at 9.
267. IRS Response, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.).
That the IRS's anti-protester activities are based on fear of cancer-like
growth of the movement is shown by Egger's remarks to Congress:
[L] et me reemphasize my concern over the effects the tax protester
"movement" may have on tax administration. At the present time,
however, we can not say that there is a discernible relationship be-
tween the illegal tax protester "movement" and our ability to main-
tain an effective compliance system.
In terms of absolute numbers, the illegal tax protesters that we
have identified are not a serious problem. For example, in 1980 some
143,446,000 tax returns and supplemental documents of all types were
filed with the IRS, yet only 18,225 returns or documents were identi-
fied as protest returns. I think this reinforces my assertion that the
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pacity of the Service to carry it out. Reagan Administration budget
cutting has not spared the IRS. The number of employees was cut
from 86,000 in 1981 to 84,358 in 1982, far below the 91,519 employees
budgeted for 1982 by the Carter Administration. 268 The Adminis-
tration plans to add 5,225 employees in 1983,269 perhaps because it
sees bolstering the IRS as a way to bring in more tax money with-
out raising tax rates.270
Unless the IRS receives much of the staffing increase it
wants,271 the 1982 Tax Act promises to strain further the Service's
already overloaded paper-shuffers.272 A major thrust of the new
tax compliance provisions is to expand information reporting re-
quirements.273 This will boost the Service's potential for nabbing
tax cheats, but may have the reverse effect on enforcement effec-
tiveness by flooding compliance agents and prosecutors with data.
On the other hand, IRS policymakers are counting on the mere
existence of information reporting in new areas to chill tax evaders
by informing them that those with whom they do business must
inform the government of transactions.274 Indeed, key parts of the
vast majority of taxpayers are honest, and do not attempt to thwart
the tax administration system.
But at the same time it is possible for public confidence in the
government's ability to fairly and firmly administer the tax laws to be
jeopardized if the illegal tax protester "movement" continues to
grow. For this reason, we think it is essential, despite the cost and
effort, to enforce the laws violated by these individuals, and to
demonstrate to the public that these tactics should not be attempted
by others.
Id. at 105-06.
268. TnsE, Apr. 12, 1982, at 57.
Understaffed and overburdened investigators count primarily on
fear to help bring about public compliance with the law. A few well-
publicized tax prosecutions, especially around tax-filing time, un-
doubtedly bring in millions of dollars of additional revenue. IRS offi-
cials bluntly admit that they are trying to create an atmosphere of
"paranoia" about taxes. Each criminal case is evaluated not only for
the flagrancy of the violation but also for how much publicity the
prosecution will create.
Id
269. Id.
270. In one of his weekly nationwide radio speeches, President Ronald Reagan
appealed to listeners to pay taxes on money that they earn in the under-
ground economy. He noted that the $95 billion in taxes lost to the treasury
because of hidden income would come close to wiping out the projected
budget deficit for 1983. Lincoln (Neb.) Journal, Apr. 24, 1982, at 1, col 3.
271. An IRS option paper, "Closing the Gap," recommended adding 917 positions
to the non-filers program and 1,000 to the examination division. Robinson &
Simon, IRS' Secret Game Plan, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, col 1.
272. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 174,260,261 & accompanying text and infra note 275 & accom-
panying text.
274. See supra note 202.
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new information reporting provisions are requirements that those
who must report transactions and payments to the IRS must also
send to the taxpayer a statement containing the same information
forwarded to the Service.275
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The courts, in their interpretations of civil and criminal penalty
statutes, have left the government in a strong position to strike
back at tax protesters. Each of the protesters' constitutional argu-
ments has been repudiated so often that Tax Court judges are be-
ginning to fine taxpayers for reraising them before the court 76
Further, the Tax Court has streamlined procedures to handle
the onslaught of protest cases. For example, most protest cases
are assigned to special trial judges to free other judges to hear or-
dinary disputes. Protesters who raise no significant factual issues,
but argue only well worn constitutional or moral arguments, will
receive little opportunity to air their protests at trial, and their
pleas will be disposed of in brief, standardized opinions.2 77
Still, protest cases occasionally raise significant legal issues.
Two issues which the government has been winning arose in the
Snoopy Freeman case: selective prosecution, and public speech as
aiding and abetting.
It is essential to the IRS deterrence strategy that the govern-
ment be able to pick out highly visible and vocal protesters for
prosecution. This also helps to obtain the most deterrent value for
each dwindling enforcement dollar. The tests developed by the
courts to deal with defenses of selective prosecution and of free
speech infringement allow the Service to do just that.
275. The 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18, requires certain payors to whom information
reporting has been extended to inform their payees of the reports. Section
311(a) (1) of the Act requires brokers (including barter exchanges and real
estate agents) to report their clients' capital gains transactions and to furnish
the clients the information sent to the government. Section 312(a) (adding
new I-TLC. § 6041(a)) subjects businesses making payments for services by
independent contractors and direct sellers of consumer goods to information
reporting; it also requires statements to the payees. Section 313(a) requires
state and local governments to report income tax refunds paid by them and to
send statements to the refund recipients. Section 314 requires large food and
beverage retailers to report their employees' tips made on credit cards, tips
reported by employees, and mandatory service charges over ten percent, and
the employer must provide a statement to the employee. Accordingly, each
new statement requirement (except that aimed at refund payors) carries a
new penalty for noncompliance. Sections 311(a)(2), 312(b), 314(b) (all
amending IR.C § 6678). Section 315(c) raised the assessable penalty under
I.R.C. § 6678 to $50 per offense, limited to $50,000 a year.
276. See supra note 220 & accompanying text.
277. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Mar. 30, 1981, at 80.
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To establish a defense of impermissible selective prosecution, a
criminal defendant must show that the prosecution was selective
and that the selection was based on some impermissible ground.278
Although the courts recognize that exercise of free speech or asso-
ciational rights are impermissible grounds for selection, they have
upheld prosecution of outspoken protest leaders.27 9
Similarly, those appellate courts which have considered the is-
sue have affirmed aiding and abetting convictions based on public
speech where protest "evangelists" at public meetings gave spe-
278. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978):
To establish the essential elements of aprimafacie case of selec-
tive discrimination, a defendant must first demonstrate that he has
been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have
not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he was
prosecuted. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the gov-
ernment's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution was based
upon an impermissible ground, such as race, religion or his exercise
of his first amendment right to free speech. United States v. Berrios,
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
Accord, United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (8th Cir.
1975).
Selective prosecution as a defense to tax fraud has not been asserted suc-
cessfully. Tax Fraud, White Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19
Am. CRne. L. REv. 427, 435 & nn.2138-2140 (1981). For a criticism of how eager
the courts are to uphold tax protest prosecutions against selective enforce-
ment objections, see Note, Selective Prosecution of Tax Protesters: Did the
Ninth Circuit Go Too Far?, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.. REV. 325 (1982).
279. The defendant in United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978), was a
Quaker who had long been active in protesting government policies by refus-
ing to file returns. When prosecuted for willful failure to fie, Catlett tried to
show that the IRS selectively investigated tax noncompliance by focusing on
those with notoriety as tax protesters. The court said that even if this were
true, the second prong of the test would not be satisfied:
While the decision to prosecute an individual cannot be made in re-
taliation for his exercises of his first amendment right to protest gov-
ernment war and tax policies, the prosecution of those protesters
who publicly and with attendant publicity assert an alleged personal
privilege not to pay taxes as part of their protest is not selection on
an impermissible basis.
Id. at 867.
Similarly, Snoopy Freeman claimed that he was singled out because of his
public speeches about the unconstitutionality of the tax system. However,
the court found neither of the two prongs to have been established. United
States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071
(1980). See also United States v. Tibbetts, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981) (selec-
tion by IRS of those most vocal in opposition to tax laws is permissible);
United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976) (conviction of political can-
didate who announced at press conference his refusal to file tax returns as a
protest against Vietnam War held valid); United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1975) (prosecution under IRS "Project Ace," giving special pri-
ority to prosecution of tax crimes by attorneys and certified accountants, held
valid).
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cific advice on how to violate tax laws.280
Favorable resolution of these two legal issues, assuming the
Supreme Court does not step in with a more restrictive constitu-
tional viewpoint, frees the Service to go after the spreaders of the
faith and to concentrate government resources on cutting off the
head of the protest movement without having to make a similarly
intensive attack on the much larger body. Early reactions to the
Michigan tax revolt accurately expressed the IRS's inability to
prosecute thousands of tax protesters, but as the Service sees it,
this missed the point. With the ability to pick off the leaders, to
prosecute the first to step forward from the lynch mob, the govern-
ment hopes to persuade the followers to break ranks.
280. E.g., United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 906 (1978).
Like Snoopy Freeman, Gordon Buttorff and Charles Dodge travelled the
tax protest circuit, making speeches about the unconstitutionality of income
taxation. They were convicted on 17 counts of aiding and abetting the filing of
fraudulent withholding forms. The aiding and abetting occurred at a series of
public meetings in Iowa sponsored by a group of workers at a farm machin-
ery plant. Buttorff and Dodge presented their ideas on taxes and discussed
common tax evasion methods. The only non-speech activity was the provid-
ing of a Form W-4 to one of the 15 persons who were convicted as principals.
The appeals court found that the speech involved went beyond mere advo-
cacy of law violation, which is protected, to become speech which incites im-
minent lawless activity, which may be punished under Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1960).
Although the speeches here do not incite the type of imminent
lawlessness referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants
did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They explained how to
avoid withholding and their speeches and explanations incited sev-
eral individuals to activity that violated federal law and had the po-
tential of substantially hindering the administration of the revenue.
572 F.2d at 623-24.
Although the Supreme Court declined to review Buttorff, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the decision does not give sufficient deference to first
amendment values and does not adhere to the Brandenburg test. See Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: Speech That Aids and Abets Tax Fraud, 63 MNN.
L. REv. 641 (1979). Brandenburg requires both a content analysis to deter-
mine that the speaker intended unlawful consequences to occur immedi-
ately, and a context analysis to show that the setting in which the words were
spoken makes it likely that criminal activity would follow immediately. Com-
ment, supra, at 644-45. Arguably this test of imminence was not met in either
Buttorff orMoss, because the circumstances of the speech allowed the listen-
ers time to interpose their own rational consideration of contrary ideas, and
allowed time for government authorities to counteract the inciteful speech
before the listeners normally would have a chance to react to the speech with
illegal actions. Id. at 646, 656, 659.
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V. TAX AND SOCIAL POLICY
Policy makers addressing the illegal tax protester movement
must take into account two broad questions of policy. First, what
is it the government wishes to achieve? Second, how might it best
be achieved, in light of possible effects on other goals?
A. Ends
Government policy goals have been alluded to throughout this
Comment. The IRS wants to bring in all of the revenue owed to it
with as little effort and expense as possible. The President and
Congress want the missing revenue to offset record budget deficits.
IRS and Justice department officials want to prevent the tax pro-
test movement from growing; they see as a serious threat the pos-
sibility that law abiding citizens who observe their neighbors
getting away with tax evasion will join them. Cutting across these
short- and long-range goals is the policy that everyone should
carry his fair share of the tax burden (as defined by the Internal
Revenue Code), and that no one should be able to escape that bur-
den for any reason, principled or not, because it increases the bur-
den of others.
Another broad policy involves the nature of the republic. The
alternative fund concept promoted by Archbishop Hunthausen
and the war-tax refusers2 8 1 strikes at the heart of representative
democracy; so does the idea that individuals ought not to pay taxes
when the money will be used for purposes with which they disa-
gree. We elect representatives to decide what the best interests of
the entire nation are and how those interests might best be
achieved. As de Tocqueville observed, the faction out of power has
an interest in obeying the laws set by the faction in power, because
the minority today may be the lawmaking majority tomorrow. 282
There are political channels through which discontent taxpayers
may work to change laws they dislike. In the meantime, everyone
must pay the taxes needed to carry out the policies set by the cur-
rent majority. According to this view, taxes are neutral; they
should not be tools of political action. To withhold taxes out of dis-
agreement with government policies or to divert taxes into a fund
set up to counteract government policy is to undermine the estab-
lished political machinery and to polarize the citizenry. 283
281. See supra note 56 & accompanying text.
282. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
283. The representative democracy model outlined above necessarily rests on the
assumption that the loyal opposition has some chance of gaining power.
Those ideological factions, ethnic or racial minorities, and religious sects
which perceive little likelihood of gaining or participating in the exercise of
effective political power have no self-interest in adhering to the edicts of the
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Similarly, our often lauded system of voluntary self-assessment
is an appendage of the national self image. Generally, we see our-
selves through the same Rousseau-colored glasses that de Toc-
queville wore over a century ago: Every citizen is a party to a
social contract. While we realistically recognize that not everyone
will adhere to the contract (and we build expensive court and
prison systems to deal with that eventuality), we expect the vast
majority of citizens to stick to the terms of the deal most of the
time. Without such voluntary compliance, the system breaks
down (or the true coercive nature of the social order begins to re-
veal itself, as some social critics would say). The result may be the
emergence of a more overtly coercive compliance system that un-
dercuts our self image as a free society, and actually restricts what
freedoms we now have.28
B. Means
It is axiomatic that policies established as means for carrying
out other policies should be consistent with the goals of the larger
policies. The IRS does not always adhere to this axiom. Efforts to
deal with the tax protest movement provide an example of means
conflicting with their ends. Or it may be that the means currently
used to deal with tax protest are consistent with certain short-
range or tangible goals, which themselves are in conflict with more
ethereal, yet more important, long-range goals.
What ought the government to do about tax protest? Before an-
swering this, we must assess what the government already is do-
ing. The IRS sets up early warning systems to detect growing
pockets of tax resistance. It demands more information from tax-
payers and devises better ways to use it. It identifies tax protes-
ters and subjects them to intensive and repeated examination,
both by auditors and intelligence agents. It selectively (but per-
missibly) prosecutes protest leaders, then publicizes the convic-
tions so as to deter others from following. It displays a tough
image to cover an inability to deal with massive noncompliance,
majority, other than to avoid repression by the majority controlled forces of
law enforcement. To the extent that significant portions ofthe citizenry lack
hope of democratic participation, the established political machinery de-
serves to be undermined, as the citizenry already is polarized.
284. Congress heard testimony April 26, 1982, before the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Oversight from taxpayers complaining of harassment by
the IRS in its compliance tactics. See IRS Collection Tactics Examined, 15
TAX NoTEs 508 (May 10, 1982). Congressman Don Young, R-Alaska, proposed
to the subcommittee legislation to restrict IRS abuses. Id. The 1982 Tax Act,
supra note 18, §§ 347-350, partially redressed such grievances by giving tax-
payers more protection from levy against their property.
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.and hopes (generally accurately) that the policy of terror will have
the intended deterrent effect.
On the other hand, the government is not doing much about
many of the causes of taxpayer discontentment. Explanations for
taot evasion include inflation, government regulation,285 the
"fiendish" complexity of the IRS's "incomprehensible forms,"28 6
and increasing cynicism about the fairness of tax laws.287 While
inflation has eased somewhat (or has become transmogrifled into
recession and unemployment) and the Reagan Administration has
taken an anti-regulation viewpoint, complexity retains its death-
grip on the Internal Revenue Code, and recent tax breaks have bol-
stered the perception that the rich grow richer at the expense of
the common workers.28 8
This puts the government's tough-guy campaign in a new light.
When people believe that the tax laws are fair, they logically are
sympathetic to government efforts to enforce them because they
see that the tax evader is hurting them. However, those who see
tax laws as biased in favor of the rich should be more likely to
identify the tax evader as a symbol of resistance against the unfair
system. The IRS crackdown then comes to be viewed as oppres-
sion of the poor by the rich (to throw a slightly Marxist interpreta-
tion on the matter).
The IRS is right in assuming that people can be terrorized into
voluntary compliance. But the formula for determining how much
terror is necessary is altered by the shift in perception about the
fairness of the tax system. Psychological studies and theories are
revealing on this point.
Many psychologists view behavior in terms of a balance of pain
and pleasure. The potential lawbreaker, if rational, will choose to
obey the law if the perceived risk of punishment outweighs the
285. USA TODAY, Sept. 1980, at 45. "Inflation has undermined much of the moral
support for income taxation." Id. (quoting James Wetzler, chief economist
for Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation). "Inflation is only one reason
for the underground economy. The financial and emotional impact of all-con-
suming government regulation and control is a second. For many people, not
reporting cash income has become their only route to economic survival." Id.
286. Hoffman, Privilege riddles U.S. tax law, Lincoln (Neb.) Journal, Apr. 21, 1982,
at 8, col. 3 (opinion column). Hoffman attributes this complexity to Congress
in creating "the swamps and thickets of exceptions, deviations, hidden provi-
sions and wig-wam clauses, lease-backs, reach backs and recaptures, limited
partnership subsections and cutie pie paragraph J's, all devised to get some-
one off from having to pay taxes. The reason for the complexity is privilege;
there is no other." Id.
287. See TmE, Apr. 12, 1982, at 57; Maltal, The Tax-Evasion Virus, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Mar. 1982, at 74; Reeves, Underground Economics, EsQUnIE, May 22,
1979, at 8.
288. Maltal, supra note 287, at 78.
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prospect of gain.289 But this is a complex calculus. People who
view themselves as law abiding citizens and who believe the tax
system to be fair may derive pleasure from obeying the law and
paying their taxes (or, at least, these people would feel a height-
ened sense of pain if they were to violate their moral precepts by
violating the law). Others may see the tax system as corrupt or
unfair and would themselves feel little agony over violating tax
laws (independent of punishment considerations). Still others
may take great pleasure in overtly declaring rebellion against the
tax laws, and invite punishment as proof of the rightness of their
cause. Presumably the martyr group is small in numbers and not
likely to grow. But the growing perception of unfairness may shift
people from the good citizen group toward the cynical middle posi-
tion, in which case they will be more receptive to tax evasion
ideas.290
Because of differing points of reference, taxpayers who see
taxes as the rightful property of the government are less prone to
evade taxes than are those who see the taxes as their own rightful
property which is being taken from them.291 Whether this latter
group will evade taxes is more a question of how strong they per-
ceive the risk of punishment to be. Why more members of this
group do not evade taxes may be because the risk of being audited
and the penalties which would follow are exaggerated.292
Thus, by doing nothing to counteract the growing perception of
unfairness, the government forces itself to increase the perception
of likely punishment. Lacking the resources necessary to increase
the actual odds of detection, the government must increase penal-
289. Id. at 76.
290. A psychological experiment found that subjects in a simulated taxation situa-
tion were most likely to evade taxes if they felt that they were paying higher
rates than everybody else, and least likely to evade if they believed they were
paying lower rates. Id. at 78.
291.
Psychological studies show that people will take risks to avoid
certain loss, and that they prefer sure gains to risky bets. This ap-
plies to tax evasion, too. Those whose point of reference is income
after deduction offul4 honest taxes are less likely to take the risk of
gaining income by evasion than those whose point of reference is
before-tax income. The latter will compare the sure loss from paying
full taxes to the uncertain loss from evading (and possibly being ap-
prehended, or, possibly, escaping notice), and they are more likely to
choose evasion. The more that people believe that tax money is
rightly theirs, the more evasion will take place, according to this ref-
erence-point effect.
Id. at 76 (emphasis in original).
292. The actual probabilities of detection and the likely size of the resulting penal-
ties make tax evasion a profitable pursuit. However, psychologically, people
tend to see small probabilities as larger than they actually are, even if they
know the real odds. Id.
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ties293 and create a false impression of likely detection by publiciz-
ing the prosecution of visible tax evaders. The effectiveness of
even this effort at deterrence is undermined by the psychological
fact that "the more tax evaders a taxpayer knows, the more likely
he is to evade taxes himself."294 Thus, prosecution of the high volt-
age tax revolt leader a taxpayer does not know is not likely to have
as much impact as the taxpayer's personal acquaintance with un-
punished tax evaders who he knows to be ordinary people like
himself. The IRS is attacking the travelling evangelist, but leaving
the local faithful to recruit converts door-to-door.
This leaves us with a contradiction. The government is step-
ping up law enforcement efforts against people who see the gov-
ernment less and less as the representative of their own interests,
and is expecting that this will encourage voluntary compliance. To
put it another way, the government is turning to fear and coercion
to make work a system founded on self-interested cooperation. As
the perception of unfairness increases, more and more people will
find their self-interests lying with the underground economy
rather than with voluntary self-assessment. And they will be more
receptive to increasingly sophisticated sales pitches from tax re-
volt evangelists.
On the other side of the street, principled protesters will be
able to use the stepped up governmental repression to justify con-
tinued tax resistance. Protesters who use refusal to pay taxes as a
tool for advancing unrelated causes may become indistinguishable
from protesters who are merely fed up with what they see as an
unbalanced tax system. The group dynamics are already similar.
The convergence will likely occur in the direction of strength of
belief. War-tax refusers will come to share with constitutional
protesters and with others who do not fit the evangelistic model a
depth of belief not now present in most tax evaders.
On the other hand, the government may be successful in strik-
ing a balance between deterrence (in pursuit of short-range reve-
293. One study found that large fines are more effective in deterring tax evasion
than are increased chances of detection. Id. at 76, 78. Another study found
that when taxpayers knew that they would benefit from part of their tax
money, they were more likely to pay their taxes, and that they were more
likely to pay when they knew they stood a chance of being audited-, the de-
gree of compliance was greatest when the taxpayer perceived both the per-
sonal benefit and the risk of audit, and least when neither perception was
present. Id at 78.
Apparently, the government is taking the tactic of stiffening penalties to
deter tax evasion, as shown by the 1982 Tax Act, supra note 18. See supra
§§ M. B. & C., and IRS proposals for still tougher penalties, supra note 18.
294. Maital, supra note 287, at 74 (quoting a study by economist Michael Spicer
and psychologist Sven Lundstedt).
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nue gains) and maintenance of the loyalty of the bulk of the
citizenry. To the extent that taxpayers comply because they fear
punishment, the Service must silence or discredit those who
preach that punishment is unlikely and that tax evasion is profita-
ble. But, in so doing, the Service must avoid enhancing the percep-
tion that this government no longer is worth paying for.
VI. CONCLUSION
The government accurately senses a danger to the system of
voluntary self-assessment and payment of federal income taxes re-
sulting from the illegal tax protest movement (which is not a uni-
fied movement at all, but is a bundle of unconnected principled
causes and unprincipled schemes). However, government reac-
tion to this perceived threat creates a new danger of validating the
complaints many of the protesters use to rationalize their illegal
tax refusal. In pursuing short-range revenue gains, the govern-
ment misconceives how its strategy of selective enforcement may
have the side effect of bolstering the widespread perception that
the tax system unfairly bleeds the middle class for the benefit of
the rich and the poor (who have fallen out of sympathy in recent
years). This may push more people into the underground econ-
omy as the increasing economic imperative to evade taxes con-
verges with mounting evidence of unfairness and uneven
repression.
The IRS's efforts to pick out self-declared tax protesters for spe-
cial treatment take the form of a tightly tailored program for surgi-
cally removing the most malignant cells from the national
taxpaying body. However, the Service may be deceiving itself. By
coming out with a highly visible campaign against tax evaders who
are stupid (or principled) enough to tell the IRS that they are re-
fusing to pay taxes, the Service hopes to drive protesters into com-
pliance. But an equally likely effect would be to transform the now
visible protest into less detectable forms of evasion. Once the
word gets around that the government comes down hard on protes-
ters who scrawl "Fifth Amendment" across their tax returns, peo-
ple with such a motivation will simply stop filing returns. This will
narrow the ambit of the Illegal Tax Protester Program to suppres-
sion of truly principled protest and the prosecution of archbishops.
There may not be a good solution to tax protest or the under-
ground economy, now that so many people have survived tax eva-
sion with no harsh consequences. Stepping up the harsh
consequences may be one answer, but one in conflict with our self-
image as a free society. A more permanent solution is to wring out
of the tax code the complexity and privilege which motivates tax
protest.
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As for the protesters for a cause, the government cannot accede
to their demands (i.e., dismantle nuclear weapons, etc.) without
violating the principle of majority rule. Nor can the government
allow the principled protesters to keep their tax money; that also
would violate the majoritarian concept and would spread a percep-
tion of another type of privilege. However, the government can
only do itself harm by jailing the archbishops and Amish farmers
who operate on a sense of a higher law, as repression of such a
sympathetic lot would only help their cause. An alternative is to
exercise the government's powers to impose civil penalties and tax
liens so that Caesar can take what is his without throwing the
Christians into the lion's den.
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